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SUMMARY
In applying the Water Resources Council's proposed evaluation pro­
cedures for water and related land resource projects to the U. 8. Army 
Corps of Engineers' proposal for a Stonewall Jackson Reservoir on the 
West Fork River in West Virginia, the Cornell University test team raised 
a wide range of conceptual and empirical issues. A full reading of the 
report is necessary to adequately evaluate our handling of these issues. 
However, we will attempt to summarize here the general nature of these 
concerns with respect to "benefit and cost measurement and formulation 
of alternatives for multiple-objective planning.
Empirical implementation of the four components of the multi-dimen­
sional social welfare function required major-additions to existing meth­
odology. For example, the test team needed to develop completely new 
methods to handle the measurement of income distribution consequences 
of project construction as required by the proposed regional and well 
being accounts. Likewise, the environmental quality account, as the only 
non-economic evaluation of a project, required special handling and suf­
fered from perhaps the least consensus about its conceptual foundation, 
method of implementation and measurement. Nor did the traditional na­
tional economic efficiency account emerge unchanged. Previous methods 
of measuring water quality and recreation benefits were found inadequate 
and suggestions were made for improvements which would bring measurement 
methodology in line with theoretical principles. For the three economic 
accounts, special consideration was given to the Issues of unemployed 
resources, productivity change and expansion impacts of project construc­
tion and operation.
In almost every case, existing sources of data and needed subsidiary 
studies were found to be inadequate for accurate application of the ap­
propriate methodology. In several cases, new data sources were discovered 
and used but the need for additional data collection and research in most 
areas was apparent.
In light of both the methodological and data issues, the test team 
found that broadening the framework of project analysis beyond national 
economic efficiency, to Include the additional criteria of regional de­
velopment , . social well-being and environmental enhancement, in no way 
reduced the need for careful and conceptually sound evaluation of the 
traditional efficiency impacts. In fact, analysis showed that increased 
emphasis should be placed on these efforts because:
a) Primary benefits will continue to make up the bulk of the posi­
tive impacts in any national efficiency analysis;
b) The two new economic accounts (regional and well-being) use 
estimated efficiency impacts as the basis for determining the 
initial impacts for these accounts ;
c) Deviations from the most efficient solution can be used to 
measure the opportunity cost of achieving other aspects of 
social welfare.
It should be noted, however, that placing emphasis on measurement of effi­
v i
ciency impacts (positive or negative), for the reasons given, does not 
diminish the need to develop methodology for the new accounts which will 
enable the analyst to properly evaluate the quantitative data in relation 
to the appropriate objective.
With respect to the formation of alternatives for evaluation, the 
test team found that the Task Force report had not presented a means 
whereby alternatives can be limited, choices made, tradeoffs between each 
component highlighted, and proper options retained. Moreover, following 
the Task Force suggestion that one alternative be designed to emphasize 
each objective can lead to a situation where a possible second best solu­
tion is ignored. The test team proposed that the consideration of alter­
natives must be limited to alternative ways of providing for water '''needs"
Then needs are defined as problems related to water functions like flood 
control, recreation, wild rivers etc. Thus, water needs do not refer 
to national objectives like economic efficiency or regional growth. Pro­
ject investments are not made because of these objectives, but rather are 
measured by them. Making higher level tradeoffs between governmental 
functions (water related investments and education, for example) to 
meet national objectives cannot be accomplished through a simple account­
ing framework. Flowing from this set of propositions is the notion that 
governmental decisionmaking must depend on the group process to both de­
fine alternatives to meet needs and to make the ultimate decisions between 
these alternatives, and between functional areas of governmental involve­
ment. No agency or group of agencies should internalize the process be­
cause appropriate alternatives can be ignored and proper weighting of ob­
jectives is not subject to a priori quantification.
Locking a uniform measure of social benefit from different activities, 
public allocation of resources is in response to a social welfare function 
that implicitly weights competing resource users. Group politics essen­
tially involves efforts of these users to gain a higher priority in the 
overall welfare function. There is no central allocating authority. 
Allocation results from bargaining among groups, guided by various insti­
tutional arrangements. Therefore, the test team concluded, from its ex­
perience, that the new procedures are a very important innovation - an 
institutional adjustment to demands by groups for a better definition of 
the overall welfare function. They do not, however, facilitate objective 
or definitive answers because none are available at this level of decision­
making. The procedures do provide new access points to the decision pro­
cess and permit a useful categorization of information for groups to use 
in their efforts to influence that process. Therefore, the overall pur­
pose of the federal use of these procedures should be to present as much 
information as possible, within the framework established, so as to facil­
itate the consideration of alternatives and the overall bargaining (or ad­
vocate) process. Although the methodology and data for accomplishing 
this objective, by using multiple-objectives, is currently less than 
ideal, the process is feasible and can best be improved by its immediate 
but cautious implementation.
v i  1
1FEDERAL EVALUATION OF RESOURCE 
INVESTMENTS: A CASE STUDY
INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
This report presents the results of a research effort whose princi­
pal objective was to empirically test the procedures recommended for evalu­
ation of public resource investments by a Special Task Force of the Water 
Resources Council.^ The main recommendations of that task force included 
a broadening of the traditional framework of project analysis beyond 
economic efficiency to include the additional criteria of regional devel­
opment, environmental enhancement, and well-being of people. Flowing from 
this set of suggestions were recommendations on the definition of the 
"benefits" and "costs" to be used with the respective accounts of the 
broaden welfare function, suggestions on methodology to be used to measure 
these impacts, implications for the division of project costs among the 
accounts and recommendations pertaining to the improved evaluation of 
alternative courses of action to meet national goals.
A number of economists and political scientists have suggested and 
agreed with the general rationale for evaluation of multiple objectives 
and the policy direction taken by the Task Force report.2 However, as 
the Task Force recognized, the methodology outlined for implementation 
was often not fully developed or was, at times, inconsistent with theore­
tical principles. Thus, they sought a "full analysis of the problems 
and processes involved in measuring effects and formulating projects."3
■Water Resources Council, Procedures .for Evaluation of Water and 
Related Land Resource Projects, Report by a Special Task Force (Washington),
June 1969.
2Robert J. Kalter et al., Criteria for Evaluation of Resource Invest­
ments , Cornell Water Resources and Marine Sciences Center (Ithaca, N. Y.),
Aug. 1969*
Jim J. Tozzi, Establishing Priorities for Public Investment, Systems 
Analysis Group (Civil Functions), Office Secretary of the Army (Washington),
June 1969.
Stephen Marglin, Public Investment Criteria (Cambridge: MIT Press), 1968.
Burton A. Weisbrod, "Income Redistribution Effects and Benefit-Cost 
Analysis," in S. B. Chase, Jr. (ed.), Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis, 
(Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution), 1968.
Arthur Maass, "Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Invest­
ment Decisions," Quarterly Jbtzrnal of Economics, Vol. LXXX (May 1966).
For an opposing view see: Jack L. Knetsch et al., Federal Natural
Resources Development: Basic Issues in Benefit and Cost Measurement,
Natural Resources Policy Center, The George Washington University (Wash­
ington ), May 1969•
2Water Resources Council, "Instructions for Testing," Special Task 
Force on Evaluation Procedures (Washington), Sept. 1969, Mimeo, p. 1.
2The result was a recommendation that the procedures suggested he subject 
to testing by an interagency test team, test teams of the construction 
agencies themselves, and interested nonfederal groups such as state plan­
ning agencies and academic institutions.
As formulated by the Special Task Force, the testing process would 
involve the application, by separate and independent test teams, of the 
suggested procedures to the same project. As they pointed out:
The test should provide a basis for assessing the recommended 
procedures under conditions where the major determining factor 
in their application will be the understanding and interpretation 
of the recommended procedures by separate teams when applied to 
the same project. . . .  To develop procedures more fully, it will 
be necessary for the Task Force to have reports on how the different 
teams working on the same problem and using the recommended proce­
dures apply their judgement and make critical decisions affecting 
formulation and evaluation. In this way, the Task Force can 
identify the key points in the formulation and evaluation process 
where more specific guidelines are needed. 11
The Task Force also proposed that the individual tests cover two 
distinct areas of emphasis. The first relates to the:
. . .  identification and measurement of program or project effects 
(benefits and costs) contributing to or associated with the major 
national objectives. This aspect of the test would be directed to 
assessing the entire range of benefits and costs of the project as 
presently formulated.5
The second aspect concerns the formulation of:
. . .  alternative plans with varying mixes of the national objectives 
as set forth in the Task Force report. The purpose . . .  is to 
determine.the adequacy and the deficiencies of the general procedures 
available for multiple-objective project formulation. This step is 
to test formulation procedures rather than to actually develop in a 
technical sense the engineering and economic detail for the projects 
being tested. If feasible, at least one alternative plan should be 
formulated emphasizing each relevant national objective.
. The approach of this research effort is patterned along those lines. 
Thus, what follows is a separate section on each of the four criteria sug' 
gested for project evaluation. When necessary interpretations of the 
language used by the Task Force were made in order to more clearly define *5
Water Resources Council, "Plan for Testing Evaluation Procedures," 
(Washington), mimeo.
5Ibid.
^Ibid.
3the hounds of an account so that empirical work could proceed. These in­
terpretations are clearly noted. Following the four sections on criteria, 
a separate section is devoted to alternatives in plan formulation and to 
a system of accounts necessary to display evaluation results. As an in­
troduction to the analytical sections of the report, a discussion of the 
relationship of institutions to the proposed evaluation procedures is pre­
sented.
Each of the authors had primary responsibility for one section of 
the report hut ideas, review, comment, and editorial assistance were 
mutually interchanged. Because of the limitations in time, money, data 
and personnel, specific sections were treated in more depth and detail 
than others. However, efforts were made'to consider all appropriate areas 
to the extent possible. In general, each major section includes sub­
sections on the conceptual foundation for evaluation of the particular 
objective, methodology necessary and appropriate for such evaluation, 
data needs and possible data sources for empirical implementation, con­
sideration of actual data sources and a summary of specific data problems, 
empirical testing of the methods proposed with realistic hypothetical data 
if necessary, and appropriate display of research findings.
Although tests were to be conducted on at least ten separate projects, 
the project chosen by the Cornell team was the proposed project of the U. S 
Army Corps of Engineers on the West Fork River, West Virginia known as the 
Stonewall Jackson Reservoir.7 The West Fork basin is part of the headwater 
area for the Monogahela River and flows through an area typical of northern 
West Virginia.^ The project involves a concrete dam and reservoir at 
Brownsville, West Virginia which would be multipurpose in nature.
INSTITUTIONS AND WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
There are a number of working definitions of the term "institution". 
Sociologist Talcott Parsons has elegantly defined institutions as "techniques
TThe project proposal is described more fully in: Senate Document
No. 109, 89th Congress, 2nd Session. It should be noted that since pro­
ject authorization, the project proposal has been somewhat redesigned in 
the preconstruction planning phase to emphasize the outdoor recreation com­
ponent to a greater extent. The test team, however, viewed this as a 
different alternative and elected to test the original proposal. The 
principal differences in.the two proposals, from the viewpoint of this 
test, were the differing methods of recreation demand estimation and the 
benefit and cost magnitudes involved.
g
°Pertinent descriptions of the natural, economic and human resources 
in the project study area will be given, as appropriate to the analysis, 
in the various sections of this report. Further descriptions of the 
basin can be found in Sen. Doc. No. 109.
for integrating value patterns of the common culture of a social system 
through their interaction in the definition of role expectation and or­
ganisation of jnotivation. "9 While admirably inclusive, this isn't very 
helpful. For questions of resource management, institutions may be thought 
of as structural guides, or parameters to action— an identifiable unit or 
series of laws and regulations, or an authority that directs relationships 
among competing resource users. Institutions help to balance the power 
among competing interest groups. The essential point of departure for 
institutional economics is that actors in the economy— individuals or 
groups~-have differing levels of power to command a price or a product. 
Institutions don't necessarily define action, but they provide an accep­
table zone of action.
We can assume that the role of government, as a set of institutions, 
is to allocate resources among activities according to the "public in­
terest"— or some conceptual social welfare function. Federal and state 
agencies, local districts, water laws, etc. are vested with funds and 
authority to act in this manner. Conceptually, the welfare function of 
society is some weighted composite of individual or group welfare functions, 
though not necessarily a summation of those functions. This conceptual 
model is behavioral, not structural or normative at this stage.
Thus, it- is posited that the overall social welfare function is a 
weighted composite of group functions and weights are operationally 
established by the relative political power of each group in the composite. 
This concept follows from the notion that government itself is nothing more 
than a collection of groups. Government is the "referee" among competing 
groups. It is, thus, meaningless to talk about removing the influence 
of special interest groups in resource management decisions and relying 
on some mythical "objective" analysis. Public decisions affecting water 
use or anything else are essentially a compromise among competing groups, 
some of which may introduce objective analyses to support their divergent 
points of view.
Schubert,^ Bentley,H ,and Truman^ have all discussed the nature of 
group interaction in some detail. Groups are taken to be the basic poli­
tical units of society. There is intra-group conflict, certainly, but the 
internal process by which a group reaches a position is not of concern here.^
9 -
Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser, Economy and.Society (New York:
The Free Press, 1965), p. 102.
10Glendon Schubert, The. Public Interest (Glencoe:, Illinois: The
Free Press, i960),
Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government (Chicago: Thediniverslty
of' Chicago Press, 1908).
12Pavid Truman, The Government Process (New York:, Alfred Knopf, 1962).
13See: James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent
(Ann Arbor, Mich.: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1962).
5Groups define the overall social welfare function by expressing demands 
or a particular notion of how resources should be used. There are nu­
merous access points for political input, and screening mechanisms to 
control the nature and number of demands made on the political system. 
Access points also serve as feedback links to the political system to 
indicate support for or rejection of system output.^ A key role of 
institutions, then, is facilitating definition of the social welfare 
function (public interest) and expressions of support or rejection of 
the resource distribution pattern that occurs.
To assure any kind of order out of this chaos of group competition, 
we have to assume some components of social welfare are shared among all 
groups, to differing degrees. Arrow,^5 Rothenberg,l° and others express 
this need for some central value thrust of society. Efficiency, progress, 
equality, freedom etc. have been identified as major value-orientations 
of American society. We say, then, that each group welfare function has 
some component of resource efficiency, and equality of opportunity or 
income. But "efficiency" is likely to relate to a particular activity-—  
for example, how may irrigation water be provided most efficiently. In­
stitutions are established to allocate resources among competing groups—  
settle disputes, regulate use, supervise the bargaining process--in ways 
that are consistent with the basic value orientations of society.
Economic welfare theory establishes the rules or the focus for this 
broader conceptual framework. The marginality of a welfare optimum is 
directly analogous to optimality conditions for the perfect competition 
model in economic theory or for the optimum resource use conditions of 
production economics. Basically, the goal is to maximize the discounted 
present net social benefit of water resources. If total benefit and cost 
curves could be plotted, the optimal point would occur where slopes are 
equal. If social welfare output of a water-using activity were calculable, 
then setting the first derivative of the total welfare output equal to 
the ratio of per unit water "price" to social value of a water unit in 
that use would give the optimum level of water use for that activity.
If these production functions were available for all competing water users 
(e.g. recreation, navigation, pollution control), then the welfare 
economist could optimize water use by equating the marginal social values 
of a unit of water use in these various components of the social welfare 
function. For water resources, this would be a Pareto optimal situation—  
shifting resources would reduce the social benefit of some activities. 
Production economists employ these analytical techniques in recommending
For a more complete discussion of the systems mechanisms through 
which groups may act, see: David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political
Life (hew York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965}.
15^Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (HEwlYork:
John Wiley and Sons, 1951)•
3-6Jerome Rothenberg, The Measurement of Social Welfare (Englewood 
Cliffs, K, J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).
6allocation of land among farm enterprises, or level of fertilizer use 
for a particular product. Early welfare theory held closely to this notion 
of measureahle utility from "welfare" producing activities. The problem 
in public allocation is, of course, the difficulty in deriving a satis­
factory unit of social benefit for water-based recreation or similar re­
source uses.
Even if social production functions could be devised for water users, 
water is not perfectly mobile and not of uniform quality or availability. 
Social outputs from the alternative activities are interrelated— there are 
externalities. And public projects for resource developments of various 
hinds come in rather discrete, lumpy units. Benefit-cost analysis is 
designed to evaluate discrete policy alternatives that are relatively 
similar, in terms of their net contribution to social benefit, while 
maintaining that utility indeed is measureable. The notion of economic 
efficiency in benefit-cost analysis pertains primarily to maximising re­
turn from project dollars rather than optimum allocation of natural re­
sources among competing activities. Some sort of non-marginal political 
economics has been suggested for evaluating public projects of differing 
hinds where analytical problems are distinct from those in production 
economics.-*-T Systems analysts are starting to acknowledge the impossibi­
lity of stating a reasonable objective function to maximize and are con­
ceptualizing a broader notion of "system".
Lacking a uniform measure of social benefit from different activities, 
public allocation of resources is in response to a social welfare function 
that ■ implicitly weights competing resource users. Group politics essen­
tially involves efforts of these users to gain a high priority in the 
overall function. There is no central allocating authority. Allocation 
results from bargaining among groups, guided by various institutional 
arrangements. The overall social welfare function may be depicted as a 
multisided Edgeworth Box with a maze.of intersecting indifference curves. 
Any indifference curve tangency along the contract curve would be an 
optimum for that particular output level. Each activity tries to achieve 
an indifference curve as far from its origin as possible.. Success depends 
on political power, theoretically a reflection of social benefit offered. 
Institutions are devised to facilitate intergroup bargaining, permit 
expression of political (or dollar) support for allocation results of a 
particular welfare function, or permit expression of an alternative 
weighting scheme. Intergrpup conflict suggests the bargaining process 
has failed-— there is no point of indifference curve tangency between the 
specific water users. Institutions may be devised to create a satisfactory 
bargaining situation, by causing a polluter to bear the cost of pollution, 
encouraging the Corps of Engineers to consider conserving a reach of wild 
river, or a similar adjustment. Institutions may create a contract curve 
for competing users when no basis for bargaining exists. It would seem, 
for example, that the suggested revision of the evaluation procedures for
ITAllan Schmid, "Natural Resources and Growth: Towards a Non-
Marginal Political Economics," Am. Jour. Agr. Econ. (Dec. 1969).
7public projects is an institutional effort to create a bargaining situ­
ation between groups placing emphasis on water uses that strongly con­
tribute to national income and groups more concerned with environmental 
quality, regional development and income distribution. Intergroup 
bargaining is not isolated from the "general will". Many components of 
the group welfare functions will be the same, an expression of Arrow's 
"moral imperatives". Differences of opinion occur primarily at the 
margin.
The absence of conflict does not mean that institutional arrange­
ments are satisfactory. A powerful group may try to maintain prominence 
in the welfare function by limiting conflict. Public policy should not 
necessarily seek the path of least resistence in the political system. 
Readings in group behavior and political system theory suggest access 
is an essential ingredient in a pluralistic system as a mechanism for 
expression of support and definition of "public interest". Access is not 
uniformly available, and must be maintained by public institutions.
Just as institutions have been devised to maintain the public interest 
with regard to competitors in the marketplace, so too must group inter­
action have guidance. Institutions must provide for effective consoli­
dation of individual demands, while assuring that the full scope of the 
overall social welfare function is articulated.
Institutions and Federal Evaluation Procedures: We may now outline some
ways that the above ideas on institutions relate to the proposed evaluation 
procedures.
1 . There is much more to water management than federal project 
analysis. Management results from many decisions by many organizations, 
groups and agencies, guided by various institutions. If the Corps of 
Engineers had never come to the Susquehanna Basin, for example, water 
management would still take place— through the political system, and group 
bargaining. In any event, the assumption that the economics of water 
management begins and ends with evaluation of federal projects is mis­
leading.
2. There is a need to continue efforts to measure project impacts.
But we also need an understanding of the political use of these measure­
ments— in many cases measurements may be pretty much beside the point. For 
example, the Sierra Club is not going to fold its tent just because a 
particular Corps of Engineers study shows low environmental quality bene­
fits. And if any of us work for the Sierra Club, we will likely substan­
tiate their position with "objective" data.
3* The economist's role need not be limited to that of a technician. 
In reality truly objective recommendations are unlikely, if possible, in 
a cardinal welfare sense. Data sources, measurement problems, etc. give 
the economist places to hide his opinions. He should recognize that he 
is part of the political process and not on some pedestal above it.1^
~\ As I. M. D. Little has said: "Rough theory, or good common sense,
is, in practice, what we require. It is satisfying, and impressive,
8b . The nev procedures are a very important innovation— an institu­
tional adjustment to demands by groups interested in things other than 
efficiency (better definition of the overall welfare function) but don’t 
facilitate objective answers. The procedures provide a useful categori­
zation of information for groups to use in their own calculations.
5. It seems that important institutional questions are not neces­
sarily the structural combination of federal, state, and local units in 
planning but a strategy for assuring broad definition of the welfare func­
tion. Any number of structural alternatives may work, if the strategy is 
assured. This might call for bigger role for the states as the more de­
centralized unit.
6. The Corps of Engineers, Water Resources Council and other agencies 
are interest groups, or at least are indistinguishable from their clien­
tele groups. Their welfare configuration has been pretty well institu­
tionalized by government, in response to political support for development 
and construction. Their calculations will always reflect their political 
orientation, and authorized activities. Federal agencies should not 
apologize for their role in the political process but neither should 
analysts, impute "absolute truth" to the calculations of the agencies..
7. The overall purpose of the federal use of these procedures should 
be to present as much Information as possible, within the framework es­
tablished.
8. The implication always seems to be that with considerable hard 
work and diligence and with our eyes clearly ahead and unswayed by greedy 
interest groups, we economists can develop a procedure for making pre­
dictable resource decisions, or at least presenting some perfect decision 
maker with a clear cut and measured definition of how a project influences 
our lives. That is a bit naive, but the effort Is useful. .
THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ACCOUNT
Although the Flood Control Act of 1936 set forth a broad and ambi­
guous criterion for evaluation of proposed federal public works invest­
ments, in the past the statutory language has generally been interpreted 
to require that a national economic efficiency~^^  analysis be undertaken *19
that a rigorous logical system, with some apparent reality, should have 
been set up In the field of the social sciences; but we must not let our­
selves be so impressed that we forget that its reality is obviously li­
mited; and that the degree of such reality is a matter of judgement and 
opinion."- I. M. D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics (Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1957), p. 279.
19As Marglin has pointed out:
. . economic efficiency as a concept for' expressing the size of
9as an aid to public decision-making on investment alternatives. As one 
of the key dimensions of the decision process, the national economic 
efficiency criterion, and the empirical method of benefit-cost analysis, 
has been the focus of sustained research and professional comment. 
Consequently, the theoretical and conceptual foundations of the analysis
are well documented in numerous standard references and will not be re-pnpeated here. v
What will be attempted, however, is to formulate methodology for 
benefit and cost measurement which is consistent with underlying theory 
and to show the necessary data needs for empirical investigation. Thus,
the economic pie . . .  is superior to the concept of national income. 
The difficulty with national income is that it is too closely tied 
to market values. . . .  if a water—resource development made great
amounts of electrical energy available for residential consumers 
at low cost, it would add more to the size of the economic pie than 
another development scheme which made smaller amounts available at 
higher cost, even if the national-income value of the latter scheme 
measured at market prices were to be higher than the former. Such 
considerations have led economists to speak of the size of the eco­
nomic pie in terms of a more fundamental principle, namely, economic 
efficiency.
Stephen A. Marglin, "Objectives of Water Resource Development in 
A. Maass et al., Design of Water Resource Systems (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1962), p. 20.
Thus, although the Special Task Force speaks in terms of a national 
income account, we shall use the more generally accepted definition for 
to do otherwise leaves the analysis on a weaker conceptual basis. The 
argument is somewhat academic in any case since as a practical matter 
methods of benefit measurement which are generally used, and accepted by 
the Task Force, for benefit —cost analysts are based on the efficiency 
approach.
200tto Eckstein, Water Resource Development: The Economics of Pro-
,1ect Evaluation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958).
Roland N. McKean, Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis
(Hew York: Wiley, 1958).
J. V. Krutilla and 0. Eckstein, Multiple Purpose River Development 
Studies in Applied Economic Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1958).
Arthur Maass et al., Design of Water-Resource Systems: New Tech­
niques for Relating Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis_and Govern- 
mental Planning (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962). 21
Robert H. Haveman, Water Resource Investment and the Public In­
terest: An Analysis of Federal Expenditures in Ten Southern States
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965).
21Broadening the decision-making framework to include multiple 
objectives does not change the theory underlying the economic efficiency 
criterion. Each criterion in a multiobjective welfare function is con­
ceived of as being independent of the others and, thus, must stand on 
its own conceptual base.
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consideration will not only "be given to primary outputs and inputs but 
to changes in productivity, technological externalities, and multiplier 
effects, to the extent that they affect unemployed resources, due to the 
project. In the process, we will attempt to point out errors in current 
practices.
In an effort.to make our task more manageable, we will discuss 
four general areas. First, the methodology and data needed to estimate 
benefits and disbenefits flowing from the primary outputs of a project.
For example, the purposes of the Stonewall Jackson Reservoir proposal in­
clude provision of water supply, flood control, water quality and outdoor 
recreation. Each of these areas will be discussed in turn. Second, : 
proj ect effects which have not ordinarily been considered in previous 
benefit-cost work but which are conceptually part of any efficiency 
analysis will be-discussed. These.include the effects of the project 
on economic growth (productivity change), externalities, and unemployed 
and immobile resources. Third, considerations related to the estimation 
of project costs and cost allocation will be discussed. Finally, the 
■analytical results of the various subsections will be used as data in­
puts for an economic efficiency analysis of the test project. In ad­
dition, the sensitivity of the resulting analysis to realistic adjust­
ments of component variables will be shown and used as one means of 
handling risk and/or uncertainty factors.
Project Fur poses; Primary project purposes stem from the pro­
blems and needs of those potentially affected by the direct outputs of 
a pro.iect. In the case of the West Fork Basin, it is apparent that the 
initial request for an investigation of water resource development po­
tential was spurred hy considerations of flood damage. Ultimately, how­
ever, water quality, outdoor recreation, water supply and flood control all 
emerged as project purposes. The primary project effects (costs and 
benefits), from the standpoint of national economic efficiency, flow from 
these purposes and will be discussed in the following subsections. First, 
however, a discussion will be undertaken of the methods, consistent with 
economic theory, which can be utilized to quantify these impacts.
Menhods of Impact Estimation:- Normally, quantification of project 
costs presents less of a problem than quantification of project benefits. 
For use in an economic efficiency analysis, this type of Impact is ob­
tained from the market values required to purchase the goods and services 
to be used In project construction, operation and maintenance.^ The 
accuracy of the techniques used to estimate these costs, however, is open 
to some question. Because this is an independent issue, it will be dis­
cussed in a later section. Emphasis here will he on positive and negative 
project benefits.
The type of cost items referred to here are only those which are 
paid for from the budget of the governmental unit for whom the effi­
ciency analysis is being undertaken. This is in accordance with the 
commonly accepted practice of treating total federal cost as the critical 
part of the budget constraint for a federal project and treating all 
associated costs as negative benefits. See: Eckstein, 64—65•
11
Methods used for empirical estimation of primary "benefits vary with 
the situation* type and nature of available alternatives, and type of good 
or service provided by the project under analysis. A number of methods 
have been suggested and used. However, the principal problems arise 
when attempting to place a monetary evaluation on nonmarket benefits.
Thus, when the outputs of a governmental project compete directly with 
private sector alternatives the methods of evaluation are clear. Market 
prices (or alternative cost) should be used to approximate benefits if 
the increased output will not change prices markedly. To do otherwise 
could bias the analysis in favor of the governmental as opposed to the 
private market alternative. Normally, private market prices should be 
used when alternatives are technologically mutually exclusive and alter­
native costs when they are not or when monopoly market conditions prevail.23 
The alternative cost principal, as applied in the two latter situations, 
measures the value of released resources available for alternative uses.
Care must be taken in using the alternative cost method, however, to in­
sure that:
1. Long-run marginal rather average costs are used in the 
analysis;
2. Comparison of public and private alternatives are done 
under comparable bases of taxes, insurance and cost of 
capital;
3. "Least cost* and not the "most likely" alternative is used 
for comparison.
If the output of a governmental project competes with the private 
sector in fulfilling a given demand and, in the process, reduces market 
prices because of lumpiness in output, project costs should be subtracted 
from alternative costs to obtain the savings resulting from public in­
vestment, which will approximate the change in real national income.
A number of dangers attend the use of this method, however. First, care 
must be taken not to count as a;-^ ain the cost of the cheapest alternative 
way of performing an unjustifiable task. Second, there is the danger of 
using reimbursement prices rather than actual costs which may be con­
siderably higher. Third, marginal rather than average cost values should 
be used in the calculations. Fourth, there is the danger of making the 
cost comparison with a monopoly rather than free market price. Finally, 
care should be taken not to use decreasing cost functions in the calcu­
lations and, thus, inaccurately estimating the savings due to a public 
alternative,
In any case, the calculation of primary benefits from projects with 
private market alternatives is methodologically easier than when no private 
sector alternative exists or when the private sector alternative is one 
whose price is significantly influenced by governmental involvement.
23'Eckstein, 239-2^5 
Maass., 19.2-222; esp. 213 >
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Under these circumstances and when the product or service under consider­
ation is a consumer good with no indivisibilities in output, proxy market 
price or the willingness to pay for additional output is normally utilised 
to quantify the benefit figure. This method assumes small increments of 
product. In a situation where product output is a consumer good but in­
divisibilities of production are present, government action alone will 
cause changes in the proxy price. Since government is the major force 
In the market for the good under discussion, it can act as a discriminating 
monopolist and produce any quantity it deems appropriate. Thus, the 
average of the with and without prices or the consumer willingness to pay 
is normally utilized to quantify the value of output. In other words, 
the market value of.the final product plus the consumer surplus is uti­
lized. Finally, if goods are producer goods rather than consumer goods 
a different approach should be utilized. Since producer goods are not 
included in the accounting of the national income, double counting would 
occur if more than the increase in market value resulting from the project 
Is included in the benefit value estimated. Thus, only the increased 
market value due to a project should be counted when calculating the 
benefit to the economy of output destined to be a producer good.
Obviously, the principal problem involved with estimating benefits 
from the output of governmental projects which do not have private market 
alternatives is the estimation of proxy demand functions. Because of the 
empirical difficulties, other courses of action have been suggested.
The Task Force report recommends that one of two methods be utilized.
First, "an estimate of the market valued benefits foregone by adoption 
of a plan to realize the nonmarket value benefits;" or second, "the cost 
of an alternative for obtaining the desired effects that would be under­
taken in the absence of the project."211' As Bromley and Beattie2  ^have 
pointed out, the first method specifies that benefits will always equal 
costs and, therefore, no new information is obtained for use in decisions 
on resource allocation. The second method utilizes alternative costs 
without subtraction of project costs and, thus, does not give a net re­
leased cost or savings due to public investment. Therefore, the danger 
exists of always having benefits greater than or equal to costs since, if 
we make rational selections, we will choose the least expensive alter­
native and compare it with the second least expensive alternative.
Neither method is a good substitute for the methods suggested previously 
which depend on transforming non-market commodities into a market context 
through the estimation of proxy demand functions. Both harm the intel­
ligent application of the efficiency criterion in making investment de­
cisions .
In light of the above discussion, it is interesting to note that 
benefit evaluation for the primary outputs of the proposed Stonewall 
Jackson Reservoir utilized the "alternative cost in the absence of pri-
Water Resources Council, Procedures for Evaluation . . ,, 38.
25Daniel W. Bromley and Bruce R. Beattie, Testimony presented to the 
Water Resources Council Hearings, Washington, D . C., September 10, 1969, 
mimeo.
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vate market alternatives" methodology for both water supply and quality 
benefits. However, an approximation of market value was used to evaluate 
flood control and recreation benefits. Using these methods and a 3 1/8# 
discount rate, the average annual primary benefits resulting from operation 
of the proposed reservoir were estimated at:
Flood control $765,000
Water supply 82,000
Water quality control 1 , 001,000
Recreation 1+79,000
$2,327,000
With this background we can proceed to discuss the specific metho­
dology suggested by the Task Force for quantifying direct project impacts. 
We will consider each functional area separately and relate it to the 
evaluation of the Stonewall Jackson Reservoir.
Water Quality Impacts: Senate Document 97 suggested that water
quality benefits be evaluated in terms of "avoidance of adverse effects 
which would accrue in the absence of water quality control . . . "  It 
continued to state that "in situations when no adequate means can be 
devised to evaluate directly the economic effects of water quality im­
provement, the cost of achieving the same results by the most likely 
alternative may be used as an approximation of value." As Indicated above, 
the latter approach is an objectionable method of calculating benefits 
from the standpoint of economic theory.
The Task Force recognises this criticism. They state that: "Water
quality is integrally associated with the uses, functions, and services 
obtained from water . . . That is, the quality aspect is a limiting 
factor in the uses to which it can be put or the services it can render." 
Thus, "any water quality component of any of the water categories should 
be incorporated in the particular water use involved. Water quality per se, 
such as reservoir storage under section 3-B of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, to meet water quality standards, should be evaluated in the 
environmental a c c o u n t . T h i s  recognizes that costs of meeting water 
quality standards, which are often set without being justified on an 
economic basis,2? should not be included in the economic efficiency calcu­
twater Resources Council, Procedures for Evaluation. . ., 78 and 83-
^For an example of one means to determine standards based upon 
economic principals, see: Paul Davidson, F. Gerard Adams, and Joseph Seneca,
"The Social Value of Water Recreation Facilities Resulting From An Improve­
ment in Water Quality: The Delaware Estuary," in Water Research ed. by
A. Kneese and S. Smith, Resources for the Future, Inc. (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).
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lations since they are outside of the normal framework of the model.
.The standards are based more upon amenities and esthetics and are applied 
as "normative legal descriptions" rather than being based upon an eco- 
.nomic justification. As the Task Force report points out:
Any regulation of the flow of the water body will affect water 
quality for any of several uses to some extent. The effects 
on each use should be calculated according to changes in their 
pertinent quality dimensions or criteria. Favorable effects 
on any use should be ascribed as a benefit for that use. Bene­
fits should not be ascribed to water quality per se. There­
fore, any flow regulation . . .  to serve a particular use must 
meet the quality requirements as well as the volume requirements 
for that use.
: Any favorable quality effects that occur incidental to regulation 
for other uses,' such as from reservoir releases from navigation,
■■ power, water supply, and irrigation, should be ascribed as a 
benefit .for the particular uses favorably affected.
Thus, the Task Force report recommends that the traditional methods of 
estimating water quality benefits due to low-flow augmentation be substan­
tially changed. Such a change flows directly from the theoretical foun­
dation of an economic efficiency analysis and is an appropriate suggestion. 
Thus:
The measure of the beneficial effects on each water use should 
reflect the extent to which the usefulness of the particular 
water use is affected. This measure may be in terms of savings 
in water treatment in the case of water supply or in terms of 
higher levels or degrees of water use for recreational waters.^9
Therefore, the specific economic consequences of water quality im­
provement must be identified, shown to exceed primary benefits from the 
project output under consideration without the improvement and quantified 
before they can be adcled to primary benefits. In essence, ah internali­
zation of a technological externality must be identified as resulting 
from the project. '
In the original study of the Stonewall Jackson Reservoir, the alter­
native cost of meeting water quality standards was utilised to determine 
the efficiency benefits from the water quality component of the project. 
The only alternative considered in this calculation was a smaller struc­
tural project for low-flow augmentation. This stems partially from the 
nature of the water quality problem in the basin. Although organic 
wastes are of some importance, the principal sources of pollution are acid 
mine drainage and hardness of the water below Clarksburg— which lies 38.9 
miles downstream from the dam site. Alternative solutions to this type 
of problem are scarce and, if a practical solution does exist, many feel *29
Water Resources Council, Procedures for Evaluation. . ., 85.
29Ibid., 85-86.
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the only one currently of general use is low flow augmentation.30
However, the measurement method is changed.under the revised guide­
lines. The specific technological externalities resulting from water 
quality improvement must he identified and measured. For example, re­
duced corrosion damage, increased recreation or reduced water supply 
treatment costs are the types of impacts required if additional primary 
benefits resulting from water quality improvement are to he added to the 
functional benefits in the efficiency account.
The test team confirmed the Corps report that water quality was not 
a major problem between the dam site and the city of Clarksburg. The 
acidity problem.develops downstream of Clarksburg.31 Although the authori­
zation report claims water quality benefits due to low-flow augmentation 
in the reach of the basin below Clarksburg, observation and conversations 
with experts in the area indicate that the project would have little effect 
upon water quality because of the relatively infinitesimal magnitude of 
the low-flow augmentation compared to what would be -needed to improve. ■ 
water quality in the West Fork.32 .In addition, it appears from close ob­
servation that little economic benefit would be gained by improving water 
quality below Clarksburg. This stems from the lack of heavy industrial 
or municipal use of water in the area between Clarksburg and Fairmont.
The principal quality problems between the dam site and Clarksburg 
appear to be organic waste from raw sewage released to the river by the 
city of Weston. From the standpoint of economic efficiency, it is dif­
ficult to see how low flow regulation would improve water quality by pro­
viding a beneficial technological externality. Moreover, other alter­
natives, such as waste treatment plants which Weston does not presently 
have and which must be assumed in existence by section 3-b of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act before benefits from reservoir storage and 
flow regulation can be calculated,33 would meet the need. Any improve­
ment beyond this would be required to meet standards determined outside 
the efficiency framework and, thus, such effects should he included under 
the environmental account. 3
3°Corps of Engineers, West Fork River . . ■, Appendix V. Other 
solutions to acid mine drainage problems are available but appear to lack 
the necessary volume requirements for a river like the West Fork. For 
example, see: Daniel C. McLean and Joseph A. Wernham, A Pilot Plant
Study of the Autopurification of Sewage Effluent— Acid Mine Drainage Mix- 
tures, Publ. Wo. 55, Institute for Research on.Land and Water Resources,
The Pennsylvania State IJniv. , June 1968.
^Corps of Engineers, West Fork River . . . , Appendix V .
■^Telephone interview with experts at the University of West Virginia, 
Morgantown. Further evidence to support this view can be found in: Ibid.
■^Federal Water Pollution Control Administration',- Federal Water Pol­
lution Control Act and the Oil Pollution Act, U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 
Washington, D. C., 1967■
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The report of the Public Health Service.on. the West Fork^ sub­
stantiates these conclusions. That report estimates the magnitude of any 
beneficial technological externalities of the project due to water quality 
improvement. Listed below are the estimated annual benefits in 2010 
for specific categories of improved water quality:
Hardness reduction: $ 39,000
West Fork River 
Monongahela River 
Acidity reduction:35
3 3 , 0 0 0
6 ,0 0 0
10,800
West Fork River Negligible
Monongahela River 10,800
Acid corrosion:
Water temperature control:
9 ,0 0 0  
11,000 
$ 69,800
The figures cited are drawn from a range of values given by the PHS 
which varied with the amount of discharge (cfs) from the proposed re­
servoir and the point on the time horizon for which the calculations were 
made. However, because the year 2010 was used, the benefits given tend 
to be higher than an average annual figure would have been. Also, when 
appropriate, the higher benefit values based on rate of discharge were 
chosen. Because of the small magnitudes involved, the ranges are not 
given nor was a sensitivity analysis for this component of the project
Corps of Engineers, West Fork River . . ., Appendix V.
35The low benefits asserted for acid reduction would appear to 
understate oeneficial effects derived from increased recreation oppor­
tunities. However, the relatively small quality improvement would have 
little impact on the recreational use of the waters below the retaining 
structure, Perhaps of even greater importance are the conclusions of a 
recent Robert R. Nathan Associates study. They conclude that no economic 
basis exists for reducing water acidity in this region for purposes of 
increasing the supply of recreation facilities since acid free water 
areas will be abundant enough "to meet a greater proportion of the ag­
gregate demand" in 1980 than they did in 1965, Moreover, they concluded 
that "human tolerance for acid polluted water, all other factors being 
equal, is probably higher than commonly believed." See: Robert R.
Nathan Associates, Inc. "Impact of Mine Drainage on Recreation," Ap­
pendix E to Acid Mine Drainage in Appalachia (A Report to the Appalachian 
Regional Commission), June 1969.
36Does not account for future needs which this report assumes will 
be handled by other alternatives at the source.
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deemed important. In view of the discussion in the previous paragraphs and 
because of the absence of any data on additional benefits from organic 
waste assimilation capacity, average annual benefits in this category were 
assumed to be zero.^T
Thus, annual water quality benefits which increase the economic value 
of water- use benefits stemming from the proposed West Fork project would 
approximate $69,800 for the efficiency account. This is an average annual 
reduction of $931,200 from the original report which use the alternative 
cost concept calculated at 3 1/8 percent interest. In general the Corps 
report states that minimum requirements for water quality control will 
be met by operation of the proposed reservoir. Minimum requirements, 
however, mean minimum standards and they do not appear, without more sub­
stantial data, to be grounded in economic need. 38 Moreover, as the Task 
Force has recommended economic efficiency benefits from water quality im­
provement should be associated with the "end use" of the water which re­
ceived the benefit and not ascribed to an independent water quality ac­
count. 39 The nature of the benefits forthcoming from improved water 
quality identified the functional area of water supply as the primary 
beneficiary of such an improvement.  ^ Therefore, the $69,800 of increased 
annual benefits due to quality improvement were placed under the category 
of water supply.
Outdoor Recreation Impacts: Estimation of efficiency benefits forth­
coming from the public provision of outdoor recreational services has, 
in the past, entailed consideration of two factors. First, an estimate 
of the number of visitor days of recreation to be taken annually at the 
proposed facility during its economic life, and second, the assignment of 
simulated market values to the projected quantities of use in order to 
derive an estimate of total economic benefit. In theory, the quantity
^In any case, it is obvious from an inspection of the area that the 
principal quality problems are not organic wastes but acid mine drainage.
n Q
JOHowever, it is obvious that additional research and planning ef­
forts need to be placed in this area. Efforts to improve our understanding 
of the interrelationship between changes in water quality and changes in 
primary benefits from outdoor recreation, water supply etc. must be under­
taken to provide a more creditable basis for evaluation.
39It should be noted that this change has important implications 
for cost-sharing of federal project costs as determined by the separable 
cost-remaining benefits method. In essence, benefit categories, such as 
recreation, are required to bear increased portions of the total project 
cost (indluding costs for water storage designed to meet water quality 
standards under the environmental account) and, by so doing, may make a
project unattractive for cost-sharing as required by statute.
^°Acid corrosion reduction also has effects on navigation but be­
cause of the small magnitudes involved and the absence of a navigation 
component for the project this effect was allocated to water supply.
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demanded and the market price or cost per unit are not independent. 
However, the practice has keen to follow the above procedure in the ab­
sence of a private market or more adequate simulation of proxy market con­
ditions .
Supplement No. 1 of Senate Document 97 has added emphasis to this 
arbitrary and incorrect separation of quantity from price or value by 
setting guidelines for benefit valuation and use estimation without 
suggesting that adequate consideration be given to their interrelation­
ship. In fact, no indication of what methodology is to be used for esti­
mating potential use is given other than to list six factors affecting 
"the extent of total recreation use." Not one of the six mentions, di­
rectly, the cost of recreation as being important to total use.^
As Cicchetti et. al. pointed out, Senate Document 97 suggests that:
After estimating the number of users for a particular rec­
reation site, as best as one is capable of doing, ... a 
group of experts choose an acceptable price which when multi­
plied by the estimated quantity, oh users would determine total 
tangible benefits in dollar terms. This chosen price would 
be, of course, a measure of value in exchange, if the price 
chosen by the experts represents the true equilibrium price.
The implicit rationale of this suggested approach appears to 
be that in the absence of empirical market price information, 
the planners are more able to estimate subjectively a single 
equilibrium price than to try to develop a complete demand 
curve. A demand schedule, the traditional device utilized in the ' 
economic analysis of total benefits, would, of course, provide 
a far superior measure of the value of alternative situations 
since total economic benefits are normally defined as the entire 
area under the demand schedule— the so-called value in use.^3
Robert J. Kalter and Lois E. Gosse, Outdoor Recreation: Projections
for 1970-1989, Special Cornell Series No. 5 (Ithaca: New York State
College of Agriculture), Dec. 1969.
h2U. S. Congress, Senate Document 97* 87th. Cong., 2nd Sess., Sup­
plement No. 1, "Evaluation Standards for Primary Outdoor Recreation 
Benefits," June 4, 196 .^
1+3
Charles J. Cicchetti et, al. The, Demand and Supply of Outdoor 
Recreation (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Bureau of Economic Research,
Rutgers— The State University), March 1969, p. 7 .
Value in use is defined as the total area under the demand curve. 
This.corresponds to the definition of efficiency benefits given by Marglin 
in footnote 19 and suggested above for use in evaluation of governmental 
output for which their are no private market alternatives. Fundamentally, 
it permits .valuation problems caused by price inelastic segments of the 
demand■function to be resolved; whereas, Supplement No. 1 makes the in­
defensible .assumption the price elasticity is always infinite for any
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Using the methods suggested by Supplement ho. 1, the average annual 
use and benefit values for the recreation component of the Stonewall 
Jackson Reservoir were calculated at:
Average annual visitation 375,600
Average annual.benefits $179,000
A unit value of $1.50 per recreation day was used in the calculations 
for general recreation, and values ranging from $0.60 to $1.85 per rec­
reation day were used for fishing. However, due to staged development 
of the site and a projected expansion of demand over the project's time 
horizon, all the use, benefit, and cost values were converted to average 
annual figures using a 3 1/8 percent interest rate when appropriate.
As the Task Force implies and as was suggested above, the present 
guidelines for calculating the benefits forthcoming from the outdoor 
recreation component of a project are incorrect and inadequate. Rather 
what is needed is methodology which recognizes the interrelationships 
between price and quantity, and reduces the possibilities of double 
counting recreation demand when evaluating a project. Such double 
counting can take place if estimation methods are exclusively site ori­
ented and fail to account for overall market demand and the competition 
for that demand from alternative sites. The Task Force recognized 
this point when they suggested:
...that a set of projections of recreation visitor days be 
developed on a comparable basis to the 0BERS national, regional, 
economic area projects. The purpose of these projections would 
be to provide a framework for project analysis in order to esti­
mate the project1s reasonable share of regional and national 
recreation demand.
Thus, demand schedules for both the proposed site and for the rele­
vant market or population are needed. Research in both of these areas 
has been underway for some time and appears to be sufficiently developed 
to permit implementation in project planning and formulation studies.
An example of the type of site oriented demand schedules which appear 
promising can be obtained from the research being funded by the Corps of 
Engineers out of the Sacramento District office. 5^ Rational and regional
size project. This, then, leads to a situation in project formulation 
where double counting or inaccurate projection of site demand is encouraged.
H  QWater Resources Council, Procedures for Evaluation..., 9o.
15For a preliminary report on this research, see: V. S. Pankey and
W. E. Johnston, Analysis of Recreational Use of Selected Reservoirs in 
California, Contract Report No. 1, Plan Formulation and Evaluation 
Studies— Recreation (U. S. Army Engineer District— .Sacramento), May 1969.
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market demand functions and associated demand forecasts have also been 
recently completed using nation-wide household survey d a t a . These 
functions could be adapted to the needs suggested above. However, neither 
adequate time nor data were available to carry out this process on the 
Stonewall Jackson proposal. Therefore, the original estimate of recreation 
benefits was taken as a proxy for actual benefits, with no particular con­
fidence being attached to it, so that the analysis could proceed.
In addition to suggesting that more adequate consideration be given 
to estimation of demand and economic value, our test suggested several 
other associated areas where problems could develop. First, the relation­
ship between physical capacity and demand has often been ignored and should 
be explicitly introduced into the analysis. For example, although fore­
casts forthcoming from a demand function for the site may be compatible 
with market demand, planned physical capacity may not be adequate to" ac­
commodate that demand. The use of generalized recreation production func­
tions is needed to insure consistency in this area as well as providing 
.more adequate information on input substitution rates so that more optimum 
resource allocation can occur.
Second, care must be taken to project net increases in demand re­
sulting from a project. Thus, subtraction of the value of recreation 
to be expected without the project, and not including losses foregone 
(due to, say, replacement of wildlife areas) as benefits, is a necessary 
part of any estimation methodology.
.Finally, benefits resulting from associated facilities which are con­
structed with funds not considered part of the budget constraint of the 
federal agency involved should not be considered as related to the project 
being analyzed. .To do otherwise leads to a never ending chain of "de­
velopment" benefits which supposedly are a direct result of the project 
but for which the "with-vithout" test. has. not been rigorously applied.
Mope will be said about this later when we discuss multiplier and expansion 
effects, but it should be noted that this is of special concern here since 
the State of West Virginia plans to construct, out of its own budget, ad­
ditional recreation facilities at the project site. One can only ignore 
this type.of effect in an analysis because of the unproven linkage. But 
mote to the point, in this case, if one assumes that the State will spend 
the same amount of funds oh similar facilities with similar impacts some­
where in the State, no net gain is obtained.
Water Supply Impacts: Senate Document 97 suggested that water sup­
ply benefits be based on the "amount water users should be willing to 
pay for such improvements." This implies the.need for proxy demand func­
tions^ like those suggested for estimating outdoor recreation benefits and 
use. However* Senate Document 97 went on to say that: "In practice,
Robert J. Kalter and Lois E. Gosse, Outdoor Recreation: Pro­
jections for 197CNL985.
Charles J. Cicchetti, et. al., The Demand and Supply of Outdoor 
Recreation.
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..., the measure of the benefit will be approximated by the cost of 
achieving the same results by the most likely alternative means that 
would be utilized in the absence of the project." The Task Force appears 
to accept either the willingness to pay or alternative cost measurement 
technique, but indicates that a possible proxy for willingness to pay 
would be the "costs of raw water" from recently developed projects in 
the region.
Proxy demand functions for water supply would provide a better ap­
proximation of the theoretical value of water in this use, Alternative 
costs techniques suffer from the same problems indicated previously. 
However, because the water supply component of a federal proj ect is sub­
ject to 100 percent local reimbursement based upon the separable costs- 
remaining benefit s method of cost alloc ation, us e of alternative cost 
techniques may provide an acceptable approach to measurement of water 
supply benefits. Therefore, in the absence of proxy demand functions 
or other means of evaluating willingness to pay, the original estimate 
of $122,100 of annual water supply benefits was retained for use in this 
report.^7 In addition, the benefit values for water quality improvement 
($69,800) were added to this account because they resulted in an increased 
value of this "end use."
The limits placed on this report, however, forced us to utilize this 
less than satisfactory solution and ignore, perhaps, the most interesting 
issues concerning water supply. The Water Resources Council should be 
urged to investigate, on a regional basis, the price and income elasticity 
of water use and possible implications of various levels of public 
pricing on the publicly determined supply function and the consideration 
of alternatives.^
^It should be noted that this value was calculated at a U 7/8 per­
cent interest rate and this results in an increase in the annual benefit 
value of $82,000 used in the original report.
^For examples of the type of demand studies which are necessary see: 
James E. Ware and Ronald M. Worth, The Price and Consumption of Water for 
Residential Use in Georgia, Research Paper Wo. 40 (Atlanta, Georgia:
Bureau of Business and Economic Research, School of Business Administration, 
Georgia State College), Oct.196/■
Delworth Gardner and Seth Schick, Factors Affecting Consumption of 
Urban Household Water in Korthern Utah, Bulletin 449 (Logan, Utah: Utah
Agricultural Experiment Station).
J. C. Headley, "The Relation of Family Income and Use of Water for 
Residential and Commercial Purposes In the San Francisco-Oakland Metro­
politan Area," Land Economics, Yol. 39, Wov. 1963, pp. 441-449.
Manuel Gottlieb, "Urban Domestic Demand for Water: A Kansas Case
Study," Land Economics, Vol. 39, May 1963, pp. 204-210.
Dorothy Dunn and Thurston Larson, "Relationship of Domestic Water 
Use to Assessed Valuation, with Selected Demographic and Socio-Economic 
Variables," Journal American Water Works Association, Vol. 95, April 1963,
pp. 441-450.
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Flood Control Impacts: Traditionally flood control benefits have
included the reduction in property and crop damages, improvements in 
the productivity of land and property, and reductions in indirect pro­
duction losses due to flood protection. The Task Force accepts these 
potential benefit areas and discusses some factors complicating their 
measurement but provides little guidance on improved measurement methodo­
logy. Because of the well documented problems centering around flood 
plain definition, estimation of future stream hydrology, estimation of 
future flood plain development without the project and impacts of in­
stitutional changes like flood plain zoning,  ^the Water Resources Council 
should recommend that additional research be centered on these areas 
in order to reduce the uncertainty associated with primary flood control 
benefit forecasts. For lack of improved data in these areas, however, 
the estimate of $765s000 in annual flood control benefits, founded in 
the Corps’ report on the Stonewall Jackson Reservoir,, was utilized.
Other Project Effects: Theoretically the economic efficiency benefits
of a project consists not only of a willingness to pay measure of direct 
project outputs but also include income impacts resulting from produc­
tivity changes caused by the project, employment of unemployed or immobile 
labor because of the project, and/or technological externalities caused 
or changed by the project. However, these latter effects, both positive 
and negative, can easily be ignored or assumed away, in whole or part, 
as unimportant if methodology is not specifically structured to consider 
them. Too often this has been the case in the real world of applied 
analysis. In other instances only certain elements of these factors 
are considered and the result is an uneven and capricious handling 
of several potentially important areas. For example, in the case of 
Stonewall Jackson Reservoir, the expected productivity change of land 
and property on the flood plain was included in the analysis of flood 
control benefits but the effects of water supply or its quality Improve­
ment component on productivity were not considered. Likewise, the in­
creased recreational usage of the waterway due to water quality improve­
ment (a technological externality) was considered for inclusion as an 
efficiency benefit but the Impacts of increased recreation visitation on 
unemployed labor were ignored. The actual importance of such factors 
is an empirical and not a theoretical question and, therefore, they 
should be considered as part of every economic efficiency analysis.
The Task Force considers these often neglected areas under a heading 
entitled "Secondary National Income Benefits."5° Under this title, two
Charles Howe and F. P. Linaweaver, "The Impact of Price and Resi­
dential Water Demand and Its Relation to System Design and Price Struc­
ture," Water Resources Research, Vol. 3, First Quarter 1967, pp. 13-32.
Joe Bain, Richard Caves and Robert Margolis, Northern California’s 
Water Industry (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).
1+9
For example see: Eckstein, Ch. V.
Robert H. Haveman, "Ex Post Performance Evaluation: The Case
of Flood Control," unpublished paper.
Water Resources Council, Procedures for Evaluation . . ., 100-111.50
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general areas which are not mutually exclusive are discussed. First, 
the existence of project impacts which result from "use externalities" 
or situations where there "exist economies of scale introduction for 
industries affected by the project output" are considered. The report 
goes on to state: "Under this condition production units may be oper­
ated at a more efficient level or interrelated processes may be better 
coordinated including the elimination of bottlenecks to the efficient 
expansion of other activities," In other words, returns to scale which 
occur with as opposed to without the project are viewed as one area 
which has often been neglected in previous evaluations. Second, re­
duced "resource immobilities," in the form of otherwise unemployed or 
underemployed resources which are utilized to a better advantage "as 
a result of the developments occasioned by the project," are considered. 
The Task Force concludes that this latter type of impact could come about 
through either project construction and operation or through expansion 
of. industries directly or indirectly using project outputs. In both 
cases, the Task Force limits the consideration of the so-called "secon­
dary national income benefits" to situations in the "area or region to be 
■effected by the project." This, however, should be considered only an 
analytical convenience and not a theoretical requirement because real 
national income multiplier effects of a project can occur throughout 
the economy even though the region of initial primary impact would not 
generate them. ^
The analysis of project effects on returns to scale and resource 
■immobilities, as outlined by the Task Force, has a number of conceptual 
and empirical problems, however. First, under the "use externalities" 
section, the report appears to confuse returns to scale (a long run 
concept which relates to proportional changes in the quantities of all 
factors employed in the production function and not to a. change in the 
proportion of factor employment), returns to outlay (a concept which 
permits changes in proportions among inputs in either the short or long 
run), and productivity change (a concept where proportions among inputs 
change in either the long or short run due to a change in technology). 
Only the former (where it results from a technological externality as­
sociated with provision of water services) and the latter (a special 
case of returns to outlay) should be considered as important to real 
changes in economic efficiency since price changes can cause changes in 
returns to outlay and these are merely transfers. Moreover, the tech­
nological change which results in a productivity impact would need to 
stem directly from the project under analysis rather than the industry 
using water services. Regardless of the exact circumstances of pro­
duction, if one is considering the impacts of a water project, the in­
dustry demand functions for firms using water services must either be
Although the Task Force implies that only benefits would result, 
it is obvious that both positive and negative impacts should be considered.
>51R. H. Haveman and J. V. Krutilla, Unemployment, Idle Capacity and 
the Evaluation of Public Expenditures: National and Regional Analyses
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968).
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assumed perfectly price and income elastic or of known elasticity "be­
fore an increase in national income can be ascribed to a reduction in a 
water constraint. In fact, depending on the market structure of the in­
dustry and the elasticity of the demand function, a net reduction in 
industry, revenue co.uld occur. The assumption of perfectly elastic demand 
for industry output is unrealistic, however, and the empirical problems 
involved in determining the shape of demand functions for specific in­
dustries are such that this type of sub-analysis should be considered 
only if a strong a priori case can be made that shortages of water ser­
vices act as a constraint on more optimal production or that a water 
project will bring about technological change. Evidence indicates that 
availability of water services is seldom an important factor in the 
costs of production for most industries.52 These factors along with 
the nature of the water using industries on the West Fork, the avail­
ability of water, and the traditional nature of the proposed project 
(no technological innovation) dictated against analyzing the test pro­
ject -for "use externalities."
Second, the terms "resource unemployment or underemployment," as 
used by the Task Force, need further clarification. There is no resource 
that cannot be put to some "higher .use" given effective demand. Fo­
cusing on unemployed labor, as the Task Force seems to do, results in 
some clarification, in view of the macro-economic value judgements 
society has made about unemployment, and reduces the amount of subjec­
tive judgement needed.
Third, in view of the essentially permissive nature of water re­
sources in the regional growth process, it is difficult, if not impos­
sible to prove any link between social overhead capital in the form of 
water resource development and the improved competitive situation and 
expansion of water service using industries, with a resultant effect 
on unemployed labor resources.53 Too many other factors are not only 
necessary but required at predetermined levels (water is usually not) 
to be able to ascribe reduced labor unemployment solely or partially to 
the effect of water development on industry growth. Moreover, an im­
provement in the competitive situation of regional industries may not 
result in a net national income gain. Again, industry demand func­
tions would be needed and the interregional tradeoffs quantified unless 
the impact is totally regional due to labor immobility.
52 . .H. R. Hamilton et. al. Systems Simulation for Regional Analysis:
An Application to River Basin Planning (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press,
1969).
53David J. Allee, "Place of Water Resources Planning in Economic 
Regional Development," In The Fresh Water of Hew York State: Its Con­
servation and Uses, L. B. Hitchcock, ed. (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown
Book Co., 1967)9 pp. 170-180.
Emery N. Castle and Russell C. Youmans, "Economics in Regional 
Water Research and Policy," Am. Jour. Agr. Econ., Vol. 50, Ho. 5>
Dec. 1968, pp. 1655-1666.
25
Acceptance of the above proposition would suggest that both of the 
approaches, suggested by the Task Force, to measure "national income 
secondary benefits"^ be rejected in the case where a. proposed project is 
assumed to have impacts on labor unemployment and immobility through ex­
pansion of industries directly or indirectly using project outputs. Re­
gardless of the merits of either approach for the measurement of re­
lated types of effects, the inability to separate joint effects, the 
permissive role of water in growth, the broad ability for technical 
substitution, and the large degree of uncertainty connected with 
forecasts of human resources immobilities^ argues that the such im­
pacts are generally small and always nearly impossible to separate and 
measure.
Fourth, water resource projects tend to be an unreliable and inef­
ficient means of reducing labor immobility and unemployment, either di­
rectly or indirectly, because of the time lags which exist between plan­
ning, construction and operation, 56 and "because of the relatively low 
levels of resources required for operation. However, the degree of un­
certainty associated with the necessary forecasts is substantially re­
duced when considering only the impacts of the project itself on labor 
unemployment. In light of this and the other points mentioned above, 
no more than a calculation of unemployed labor resources put to work as
 ^The first approach proceeds from "establishing the total achievable 
level of national income secondary benefits that may be forthcoming from 
an economic area from all forms of developmental investments and estab­
lishing the role and contribution of a specific water resources project 
therein." The second approach is "simply to build upon the effects of a 
specific water resources project and other developmental investments that 
may be required to determine the secondary benefits in the presence of 
otherwise immobile resources." Water Resources Council, Procedures for 
Evaluation . . ., 107. 5*
55Because it is the explicit policy of governmental units to reduce 
the rate of labor unemployment and increase mobility, numerous exogenous 
factors can and will influence such forecasts. The OBERS (Office of 
Business Economics and Economic Research Service) economic projections 
reflect this fact in the numerous and restrictive assumptions which 
underlie them. An assumption as basic as that on population growth 
could have drastic effects on the final forecasts. Yet no range of re­
sults based upon varying assumptions is given for consideration and, 
therefore, the ability to isolate important assumptions for further study 
is unavailable. For these reasons and because of their macro orientation, 
the OBERS economic projections were found to be little aid in the analysis 
of specific project proposals. Projections of the severity and extent 
of labor unemployment, based upon a range of OBERS forecasts, would have 
been helpful to the evaluation of resource immobilities but were not 
available.
? Julius. Margolis, "Public Works and Economic Stability," Journal. ■ 
of Political Economy, LVII (Aug. 19^9), PP* 293-303.
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a.direct and indirect result of the construction, operation and main­
tenance of a -water resource project is justified. Thus, the multiplier 
effects of project construction and operation on unemployed labor, as 
veil as the direct effects, should he accounted for if unemployed labor 
resources exist.,in the nation. However, possible effects of project 
outputs on the expansion of other industries and the resultant direct 
and indirect effects should not be calculated for the reasons cited 
above. Moreover, care must be taken to ascertain the regional origin 
of labor directly employed at the project site and, in light of this, 
to determine the actual extent of unemployment reduction, hot to con­
sider this factor opens the possibility of merely transferring already 
employed resources to the region of the project. This is equally true 
but more difficult to quantify for any multiplier impacts which occur. 
Although it does not consider this transfer question adequately, the 
most well developed methodology for calculating the national and re­
gional indirect or multiplier impacts of a project on unemployed labor 
resources is the recent study of Haveman and Krutilla.57 Direct im­
pacts must be estimated separately.
Because of its location in the Appalachia region, the proposed 
Stonewall Jackson project was analyzed for its "area redevelopment bene­
fits" in the Corps' study report. This analysis corresponds in sub­
stantial degree to the framework suggested for analysis by this study.
The employment benefits were determined on the basis of "wages paid to 
persons employed during construction and operation of the project who 
would otherwise be unemployed, when these wages are paid to persons re­
cruited from local areas classified as economically depressed."5° How­
ever, no indirect or multiplier effects of the project on unemployed 
labor in either the region or nation were calculated. Due to the rela­
tively low national unemployment rate which has been maintained up until 
recently, this would probably not have been of importance to the overall 
estimation of benefits. Recently even unemployment levels in the project 
area have been reduced to frictional rates although the State of West 
Virginia remains at close, to a seven percent unemployment rate.59 Al­
though these factors may have caused an underestimate of the employment 
benefits, several other aspects of the Corps methodology could have 
lead to an overestimate. For example, both federal and non-federal costs 
were included in the calculations, when it is safe to assume that, in 
the absence of the project, local expenditures would have been used 
for other purposes with no resulting net gain (except to the extent 
that the mix of Employment effects would have differed). Moreover, 
no empirical varification of the assumptions concerning regional origin 
of the labor component were made nor can it be assumed, as the report 
appears to do, that existence of unemployed labor of specific required 
skills in the region of construction is tantamount to its being put 5789
57Haveman and Krutilla.
58Corps of Engineers, West Fork River . . ., Appendix X.
59State of West Virginia, Labor Market Digest (periodic).
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to work.^® Likewise, the assumption, for both construction and operation, 
that unemployed labor would be utilized before intra- and inter-region 
transfers appears based on highly unrealistic assumptions. Finally, 
both the assumed time horizon for the impacts (twenty years) and the 
assumption that, regardless of skill, all labor received comparable 
wages appears unrealistic in the light of actual experience. Obviously, 
additional research efforts need to be placed on these questions. How­
ever, because the estimation errors appear to be partially offsetting 
and for lack of more of the detailed data required, the Corps estimate 
of $137)000 in equivalent average annual employment benefits over the 
100-year life of the project were accepted.Ol One other point of some 
importance (especially for projects which bulk relatively large in a 
region's economy during construction) which was not considered here for 
lack of data is the disruptive effects on the local economy of rapid 
labor inflows and outflows during the period of construction. This 
type of negative impact along with the possible seasonality of certain 
industries, such as recreation, which are associated with water resource 
developments should be recognized and accounted for in future evaluations.
Project Costs: As indicated in the introductory portion of this dis­
cussion on the national economic efficiency account, the federal capital, 
operating, maintenance and repair costs associated with water resource 
investments are conceptually and empirically easier to quantify for evalu­
ation than project benefits. All that is required is an estimate of the 
market prices of the goods and services to be utilized by the project pro­
posal. Yet, ex post studies have indicated that a wide deviation often 
occurs between survey cost estimates and actual c o s t s T h e  reasons
Especially important here is the fact that the unemployment base 
was estimated for the month of March (a traditionally high unemployment 
month for construction) and does not appear to be realistic when applied 
to actual months of peak construction activity.
It should be noted that although conversion of the twenty year 
time horizon of employment benefits to a present value and then amor­
tizing this figure over the 100 year project time horizon will lead to 
the correct mathematical result, it leads to a grossly misleading display 
of actual project benefits. The unaware can easily be lead to believe 
that such impacts occur in a constant annual amount over the 100 year 
time horizon of the project when, in fact, the major impact occurs during 
the construction phase of the project only.
62For example, see: Maynard M. Hufschmidt and Jacques Gerin, ."Syste­
matic Errors in Cost Estimates for Public Investment Projects," paper 
presented at a Universities - National Bureau of Economic Research Con­
ference on the Economics of Public Output, April 26-27, 1968.
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Public 
Works, The Civil Functions Program of the Corps of Engineers, United 
States Army, Report to the Committee on Public Works, House of Repre­
sentatives, by Mr. Jones of Alabama from the Subcommittee to Study Civil 
Works, Eighty-Second Congress, Second Session, December 5S 1952, House 
Committee Print No. 21.
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for such deviations, both positive and negative, vary but generally in­
cluded components of inflation, project modification and simple mis-esti- 
mation of project requirements. After an extensive investigation of the 
cost estimation problem, Haveman concluded that the "Corps cost estimation 
procedure is characterized by a significant inconsistency in achieving 
accurate cost estimates for individual water resource projects. His 
analysis, based upon real rather than money costs, indicates that many 
of the estimation errors are offsetting and, therefore, ex ante estimates 
of overall program costs have a high degree of accuracy. This is of 
little consequence, however, to the economic evaluation of individual 
projects. In the absence of more accurate cost data or estimation 
techniques, experience creates a strong arguement for a sensitivity analy­
sis of a project's cost estimate as one means of allowing for risk and 
uncertainty. This will be carried out at the end of this section for 
the proposed Stonewall Jackson Reservoir by using the Corps initial capital 
cost estimate of $35,936*000 as the'reference point..6
Although problems of cost estimation were not raised in the Task 
Force report, another issue related to project costs was. That was 
the report's directive concerning allocation of costs among objectives.
This issue has been adequately discussed elsewhere^ but a portion of 
this is repeated below for purposes of clarity.
The Task Force .indicates on page 29 that: "... belief its and
costs have meaning only to the extent that they can be related 
to objectives..." In view of their recommendation on multiple 
objectives, they state that the need emerges "to make explicit the 
evaluation principle of relating benefits to objectives." How­
ever, on page 31, the report goes on to point out that the ob­
jectives "are not mutually exclusive accounts since benefits 
that would be assigned to each cannot be added to a grand total 
of benefits." All of these statements are well taken since pro­
jects produce national income gains as well as benefits attri­
butable to other objectives like regional growth and environ­
mental quality. Furthermore, benefits which are counted under
Office of the Chief'of Engineers, Headquarters, Department of the 
Army "Engineering and Design, Project Cost Estimating - Civil Works," 
Engineer-Circular No. 110-2-1301, February 3, 1965-
63Robert H. Haveman, "Ex Post Performance Evaluation: The Estimation
of Project Costs," unpublished paper.
S k Haveman's analysis indicated that the mean percent deviation of the 
estimated from realized cost was l4 percent for multi-purpose projects.
To the extent that this was not due to project modification, it can pro­
vide a guide for sensitivity testing. Ibid.
65Robert J. Kalter et. al■, Criteria for Evaluation of Resource In­
vestments.
Robert J. Kalter, Testimony Presented to the Water Resources Council 
Hearings, Washington, D. C., September 10, 1969, mimeo.
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one criterion framework may also be applicable to other objec­
tives. For example, certain national income gains of a project 
can also be gains to a region and should be accounted for under 
both objectives. Although a given dollar volume of benefits 
would be counted twice in this case, it is not double counting 
in the traditional sense because of the conceptual difference 
in objectives and the resulting fact that benefits accruing to 
the two accounts cannot be added together to give a "grand 
total."
The same argument holds true for the cost side of the ac­
counting frameworks. However, the Task Force does not follow 
this line of reasoning. On page 57 they state:
"The Task Force, proposes that national income and other 
costs required to realize the benefits contributing to 
a given objective be assigned to that objective under 
column (2) or (3) of.the table. When a plan formulated 
for maximum net national income is modified to achieve 
another objective it is proposed that the incremental 
costs be assigned to the other objective. If the incre­
ment also results in additional national income gains 
these would be entered in the national income account 
with the reassignment of an equivalent amount of the 
costs of the increment. Thus, an equal amount would be 
reassigned to both benefits and costs in the national 
income account and the benefit-cost ratio in the modi­
fied national income account would be a measure of the 
return In that account. The system would reveal the 
cost in national income terms of achieving the other 
objectives."
... However, to follow this suggestion would destroy the con­
ceptual foundation upon which ’the analysis of Individual objec­
tives rests. All proposed projects will have implications for 
all of the various objectives. Therefore, project analysis 
should show the effect of the project on each of the objectives. 
This can not be accomplished If the Task Force recommendations 
are carried out. For example, If costs properly included under 
the national efficiency framework are allocated to other objec­
tives because a project has implications for those objectives, 
the meaning of the national efficiency analysis would be destroyed. 
This can be illustrated by a hypothetical.example. If a proposed 
river basin project had a projected present value national effi­
ciency benefit o£U$100 and a projected present value national 
efficiency cost of $50, the benefit-cost ratio would be 2.0 and 
the net present value efficiency benefits would be $50. For 
simplicity we will assume no benefits to the regional or other 
objective accounts. How assume that an increment of $25 in 
national efficiency costs is added to the original proposal for 
the sole purpose of providing a regional benefit. Further, assume 
that the actual result of that addition produced $50 of present 
value regional benefits but no benefits to other objectives, in­
cluding national efficiency. The modified plan is in actuality 
a different alternative from the original plan. It would have
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the same national efficiency benefits hut a $75■ national effi­
ciency cost. The result is a benefit-cost ratio of 1.33 and 
$25 of net present value efficiency benefits. However, in addi­
tion, $50 of regional benefits are obtained at a zero cost to the 
region ^except for their share of taxes] and a $25 cost to the 
nation. The tradeoffs between the two alternatives are made ex­
plicit.
If the Task Force recommendations are followed, however, the 
results of the national efficiency analysis will not differ be­
tween the two alternatives— i.e., both would show a 2.0 ratio 
and $50 of net benefits. This is obviously not the case because 
all national costs are not included for the second alternative. 
Furthermore, the analysis does not show "the cost in national 
income terms of achieving other objectives." The latter is also 
a stated goal of the Task Force recommendations but carrying out 
their recommendations on cost allocation would make it impossible 
to accomplish as well as rendering the analysis shown in the 
national efficiency account meaningless.^6
Therefore, the Task Force should reject its initial directive that 
total project costs be allocated among the various accounts in accordance 
with the proportion of costs required to meet specific objectives. Aside 
from leading to arbitrary and capricious allocation methods, this guideline 
destroys the conceptual foundation of the various accounts and does not 
permit tradeoffs between objectives to be displayed quantitatively.
t
Economic Efficiency Evaluation of the Proposed Stonewall Jackson Reservoir: 
The resxilts of the previous discussion and analysis, as applied to the 
proposal for the West Fork River, can now be brought together and summa­
rised through the use of techniques design to measure the economic effi­
ciency of project proposals. The data to be used in this analysis are 
summarized in Table 1. With a discount rate of h 7/8 percent and a 
time horizon of 100 years, the following results were derived:
B/C ratio =0.75
E-C = - $9,533,165
Rate of Return (internal) = 3-5%
0/K Ratio = .00^55 (ratio of annual to fixed costs)
Thus, the project is economically unjustified from a national efficiency 
point of view by all measures^? used here, depending of course on the *67
Robert J. Kalter, Testimony.
67For a detailed discussion, of the differences between the three 
criterion forms, see: Otto Eckstein, Water Resource Development: The
Economics of Project Evaluation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1958), ch. III.
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TABLE 1
BENEFIT-COST DATA FOR STONEWALL JACKSON RESERVOIR
Initial Investment 
First Cost
Interest During Construction @ 4 7/8 
Total
$33,486,OOOa 
2,450,000 
$35,936,000
Average Annual Charges
Interest (4 7/8%) $ 1,752,000
Amortization (100 yr. life) 31,800
Operation and Maintenance 146,700
Major Replacements _____17,000
Total $ 1,947,500
Average Annual Benefits
Recreation $ 479,000
Water Supply 191,900
Flood Control 765,000
Employment Benefits ____137 ,000
Sub-Total $ 1,572,900
Adjustment for net loss
of productivity on land -111,000
Total $ 1,461,900
aPartially based upon cost of Initial development of recreation 
facilities and discounted costs of future recreation developments.
^Placed as a negative benefit because it is not part of the fed­
eral cost constraint. The original Corps report included this item as 
part of annual costs.
Source: Senate Document No. 109, 89th Congress, 2nd Session.
Data modified as noted in previous discussion and by using 47/8 per­
cent interest rate when appropriate.
interest rate used to determine the marginal internal rate of return.
If capital costs were 4 7/8 percent, for example, a return of 3.5 percent 
could not be justified.
The results of such an.economic feasibility study, however, can 
be tested for their sensitivity to adjustments in the various parameters 
and value determinations integral to the conclusions of the analysis.
For example, the methods used to measure benefits and costs, and the use 
of differing time horizons and discount rates can all produce a range of 
possible results from a national economic efficiency analysis. Normal 
conditions of risk and/or uncertainty can account for such a range in 
actual practice and one available method of handling such factors in a
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pre-construction analysis is to perform a sensitivity analysis. Then 
alternative results can "be compared with both the realism of the assump­
tions and the magnitude of the impacts forthcoming from the use of these 
assumptions.
A number of possible adjustments and combinations of adjustments 
could he carried out. However, rather than a detailed analysis of each 
functional component, only two gross modifications of the Stonewall 
Jackson base line data will be made.68 This will serve to highlight the 
possibilities of a sensitivity analysis and the need to think in terms 
of a range of results. At the same time, it will not over complicate 
the display of results need for this test. The two data modifications 
will include a ten percent increase and decrease in the project capital 
costs69 and a similar change in project benefits. The latter is based 
upon a conservative a priori judgement concerning the uncertainty of 
forecast results associated with the techniques used for measurement of 
recreation benefits and water quality improvement impacts. Thus, eight 
possible combinations of results, which differ from those derived from 
the reference data, will be calculated. Ho changes were made in the rate 
used for discounting or the time horizon of the analysis. The former 
has been sufficiently institutionalized to be taken as an appropriate 
indication of the social rate of time preference while variation in the 
latter, given the present discount rate, would not effect the analytical 
results to a significant degree if it is not lowered below fifty years.
This results from the low present values of those portions of the bene­
fit or cost time streams which occur after fifty years when discounted 
at current rates. The results of the sensitivity test are shown in Table 2.
The sensitivity test did not change the initial conclusion that the 
proposed Stonewall Jackson project was economically unjustified. Thus, 
more confidence can be placed in the results, provided one accepts the 
underlying measurement methods and assumptions. Moreover analysis using 
the discount rate expected to be authorized in the coming fiscal year 
(5 1/8J0  would have fortified the conclusion.
For a more complete sensitivity analysis of a project, see:
L. W. Libby and R. J. Kalter, Critique of the Economic Justification 
of the Genessee River Project at Portageville, New York, A. E. Res. 
2bV, Department” of Agricultural Economics, Cornell Univ., Oct. 1968.
See footnote 62, page 28, for the rationale behind this adjust­
ment .
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33
TABLE 2
CRITERION SENSITIVITY TO CHANGES IN 
INITIAL INVESTMENT AND ANNUAL BENEFITS
Annual
Benefits
Initial
Investment
Economic Measures8,
B/C B-C ($1,000) R of R 
(percent)
0/K
Original Original 0-75 $-9,533 3.5 .0076
Original 10# Inc. 0,69 -13,127 ' 3.1 .0071
Original 10# Dec. 0.83 -5,970 3.9 .0051
10# Inc. Original 0.83 -6,960 3.9 .0076
10# Dec. Original 0.68 -12,506 3.0 .0076
10# Inc. 10# Inc. 0.76 -10,157 3.5 .0071
10# Inc. 10# Dec. 0.92 -2,966 7.7 .0051
10# Dec. 10# Inc. 0.62 -16,100 2.7 .0071
10# Dec. 10# Dec. ' 0.75 -8,913 3.7
1—1l_f\OO
Calculations based on 100 year time horizon and 7 7/8 percent dis­
count rate.
THE WELL-BEING ACCOUNT
The Task Force stated that the well-being objectives were to "con­
sider the personal, group, and community effects of the project or pro­
gram activity. Since some of these well-being objectives have a loca­
tional impact, there is a close relation to regional development objec­
tives. Included are such objectives as security of life and health, 
national defense, personal income distribution, and inter-regional 
employment and population distribution. " / 0 However, in an effort to 
specify the bounds of this account more concretely so that quantitative 
analysis could be carried out, the test team decided to restrict the 
analysis undertaken to considerations of personal income distribution. 
This type of effect has previously been ignored In the economic analysis 
of water resource investments, yet appears to be an important part of 
the decision makers objective function.71
^°Water Resources Council, Procedures for Evaluation..., 27.
^Arthur Maass, "Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevancy to Public
Investment Decisions," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXIX (May, 1966)
pp. 2 0 8-2 2 6.
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Moreover, the personal income distribution aspect was the only compon­
ent suggested for consideration under the well-being objective which was 
both susceptible to economic analysis and at the same time not considered 
as part of the other three accounts. For example, national defense objec­
tives have always been removed from the economic efficiency framework and 
analyzed through cost-effectiveness procedures. Security of life and 
health is subject to quantification in monetary terms and, therefore, can 
be made part of either an economic efficiency or equity analysis. There­
fore restriction of the analysis to questions of personal income equity 
would appear to be based upon a logical set of assumptions.
General Procedures: Income is redistributed by federal water resource in­
vestments whenever the distribution of net benefits is nonproportional to 
the original income distribution. pn order to determine the magnitude 
of the net benefit accruing to an income class, the benefits received by 
that class are defined as a portion of total project benefits.73 The costs 
born by each income class are defined to include a portion of the indirect 
payment, via taxation, of total investment and operating costs of the pro­
ject, and any direct payments for benefits received.7^ Then, the total 
cost is netted against the total benefits to each class, and the resulting 
net benefit distribution is compared to the initial income distribution.
The Model: If the benefits to an income class accrue to that
class in the absence of reimbursement,75 the net benefit can be il-
B. A. Weisbrod, "Income Distribution Effects and Benefit-Cost Analy­
sis," in S. B. Chase, ed., Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis (Wash­
ington: The Brookings Institution, 1968).
T2The term "redistribution" is used here to denote a comparison be­
tween an initial or reference income distribution and the distribution 
of project net benefits. Thus, it refers to a flow and not to the re­
distribution of a stock.
73If the analysis takes a national view point, total project benefits 
would correspond with national efficiency benefits. A regional analysis, 
however, would consider the total regional benefit of a project including 
the appropriate transfers. For a further discussion of this point see 
the following section on the regional account.
74If the relative impact of a project on income distribution is of 
major concern, reimbursement is not a complicating factor and the budget 
constraint is fixed, the cost side of the distribution account will be 
fixed and will not affect the net. Thus, only the distribution of benefits 
is required. If, however, the absolute impacts are of concern, reimburse­
ment is required and/or the budget constraint is flexible and depends on 
project evaluation, the cost side of the account must be quantified.
75The term "reimbursement" refers to the partial or total' repayment 
of project costs, or, alternatively, payment for benefits received as a 
result of a project. For example, if the federal government provides ■ 
the initial funds for the construction of a project but these funds must 
be repaid, reimbursement is said to occur.
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lustrated by Figure 1. Z^ represents the portion of the tax payment by
FIGURE 1
income class A “which is allocated to the construction of a project.
The benefit of the project to the class is represented by TB^. TC_/\_ 
is the total cost to class A and includes Zp plus income class A's 
portion of annual operating and maintenance costs. The net benefit 
to class A is measured as the difference between TB^ and TC^. It 
may be positive or negative depending upon the quantity of units, Q, 
purchased or consumed. TBj\_ and TC^ may be represented as curvilinear 
functions, especially in the case of a producer's good where TB^ be­
comes a total value product curve.
However, the benefits or costs other than the initial tax, Z, 
accrue to the income classes over time, and a discounting procedure is 
necessary to place them on a present value basis. Therefore, the con­
ceptual model is more completely expressed in mathematical form.
(1) TB. =A
iI
t = 1
At
(1 + i)'
The present value of the benefit to class A is represented by equation 1 
where B ^  represents the annual dollar benefit to the class, i the dis­
count rate, and T the time horizon. The nature of "i" and of "T" will 
be discussed below. The present value of a project's variable costs
TV °At 
L .(1 + i)*
t = 1
born by class A is represented by:
(2) 0CA =
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when represents annual operating, maintenance and repair costs. Equa­
tion 3, then, represents the total present value cost of a. project to 
class A.
(3) TCA ZA +
xI
t = 1
°At(TTTF
The present value of the net benefit 
simply a combination of equations 1 and 3
accruing to income class A is 
as represented in equation U.
w Net Benefit At
{1 + i)t A
°At
( I T  "i^
If there is reimbursement for a portion or all of the costs of the 
project, the analysis is altered, although the basic conceptual framework 
remains intact. Reimbursement procedures will usually have inherent dis-- 
tributton effects. For example, the Corps of Engineers may allocate a por 
tion of a project’s investment cost to its water supply function. Those 
localities receiving the water supply are required, by statute, to repay 
over time the allocated cost of water supply. The effect of such a reim­
bursement procedure upon income group C can be seen In Table 3, and the 
following mathematical formulation, where:
Z = tax revenue used to finance the water supply function 
by the federal government. T
R .=■reimbursement in dollars
B =  benefits '
J = income classes (J = C, D, E).
TABLE 3
EXAMPLE OF REIMBURSEMENT DISTRIBUTION EFFECT
Income Class Z B R
C 10 20 30
D 20 30 20
E 30 20 10
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In the example shown in Table 3, income class C pays 10 in taxes to 
finance the water supply component of the project and through consumption' 
receives 20 benefits. However* federal law requires that the total invest­
ment cost of water supply or 60 (assume that all figures are on a present 
value basis) be repaid to the federal government by the locality receiving 
the supply,^ The initial effect on class C is that it pays 10 in taxes 
and receives a benefit of ~2G or a positive net benefit of 10. However, 
when reimbursement is taken into consideration, the final effect is that 
class C pays 30 and receives a benefit of 20 or a negative net benefit 
of 10JT For class C the income distribution effect changes from +10 
to -10 because of reimbursement.
However, if reimbursement was 100 percent and proportional to the 
taxes paid, income class C would reimburse 10/60 of R or 10. Proportional 
reimbursement may be represented as:
E
where Kq is the proportion of the total tax paid by income group C. The 
remainder of the expression is the present value of the total reimburse­
ment, or 60 in the example. The proportion Kq multiplied by the present 
value of the total reimbursement is the amount of reimbursement that would 
be paid by income class C if reimbursement was proportional to the tax 
structure.7°
The actual present value of the reimbursement paid by income class C 
may be written as:
(6) RCt
TTTTF
 ^The example and subsequent formulation assumes that annual operating 
and maintenance costs will either be paid directly by the project bene­
ficiaries or will be non-reimbursable. In any case the analysis would 
be the same.
^The reimbursement figure does not include the original taxes of 10 
because it- assumed that the 60 in taxes for the project was a loan by 
society to itself and that loan is being repaid. Therefore, although the 
federal tax cost to society as a whole is zero, the distribution impact is 
dependent on the nature of reimbursement.
^Note that reimbursement does not need to be 100 percent for this 
expression to hold.
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The difference "between the actual reimbursement and proportional reim­
bursement may he titled the "reimbursement adjustment." It is measured 
as a positive or negative deviation from the tax structure. The invest­
ment cost for an income group, therefore, consists of the initial tax 
plus the reimbursement adjustment and may be expressed as follows for 
income group C:
The total cost to income group C is expressed by the actual invest-- 
ment cost plus the present value of operating and maintenance costs ac­
cruing to income group C. Therefore, the net benefit to any income 
group, J, is expressed as:
(8) Net BenefitJ JtV  i)t(1
+
Conceptual Problems: A number of conceptual problems attend the use
of a framework like the one posed above. First, the model presented is 
intended to measure the initial distribution effects of water resource 
investments. However, initial distribution effects will cause a succes­
sive round of impacts on the economy and, therefore, the final effect 
will probably differ from the initial impact. For example, assume that 
income is transferred from group B to group A. The expenditure patterns 
of group A may be different than those of group B. When group A spends 
the new increment of income, there will be other distributional effects 
due to this fact. Similarly, group B contracts expenditures, and this 
effect is felt throughout the economy. Although these "secondary effects" 
may be of great importance and can not be passed off as transfers, as 
similar effects are in the efficiency account, methods of quantification 
may be difficult to develop and implement. Consequently, they will not 
be considered in the subsequent analysis. Empirically this may not be 
of great importance for purposes of this study because the analysis will 
be confined to a small region where such impacts would be minor. Con­
ceptually and for analysis of larger regions or the nation, however, ad­
ditional research needs to ’be done in an effort to explore the implications 
of the round by round effects.
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A similar problem centers in the area of capital gain's. Due to re­
source immobilities, water resource investment will create capital gains 
to some and losses to others (of a windfall nature), and the distribution 
of income may be altered in this manner. The distributional model, out­
lined above, could be adapted to handle such a situation. However, data 
problems were insurmountable for this test and the issue was not considered.
Third, as indicated above, a discount rate must be selected to dis­
count benefits and costs to a common present value base. Aside from 
the issues surrounding the estimation of the overall social opportunity 
cost of capital, it may be desirable to use a different interest rate for 
different income classes based upon the assumption that income classes 
will value future benefits and costs differently. Such an adjustment 
was not considered for this test nor was a discount rate which differed 
from the current rate used by the federal government explored.
Fourth, the length of the time horizon over which distributional ef­
fects are to be considered is another important matter for study. For 
example, the composition of income classes may change over time due to 
external factors and, therefore, the demand by any one class for a pro­
ject's output may be expected to change. Hence, the quantity consumed 
will be altered, which in turn results in an altered distributional 
effect. Thus, it would appear that the distributional effects can only 
be evaluated, using the above fomulation without modification, over rela­
tively short periods of time. However, for the quantitative portion of 
this test the time horizon will be that used for the efficiency analysis—  
100 years. This implicitly assumes no change over time in the composition 
of the income classes.
Finally, the actual allocation of project costs and benefits to in­
come classes presented numerous conceptual and empirical problems.
These will be discussed as they appear in the analysis to follow.
Implementation of the Model: Given the conceptual model and the simpli­
fying assumptions underlying it, we can now proceed to questions of em­
pirical implementation. This will be done in the context of the Stonewall 
Jackson Reservoir proposal.
The Region of Analysis: The income distribution effects of water
resource investment can vary depending upon the region defined for quanti­
fication of such impacts. The model outlined above, however, was for­
mulated from the national point of view. To use it in a regional context, 
reimbursement would need to be zero or a slight modification of equation 8 
would be needed. Such a need stems from the normal reimbursement situ­
ation where a local or regional unit of government is required to repay 
to the federal government all or part of total federal costs rather than 
just the regional share of federal taxes devoted to a project. Thus,
-Zj in equation 8, which in the regional context would denote the regional 
portion of federal taxes paid by income class J, would give the improper. 
Value against which the "reimbursement adjustment" should be applied.
The value that should be substituted for Zj in equation 8 can be repre­
sented by:
(9)
where, Z^ represents total federal investment cost;. Zj^ represents total 
federal investment cost distributed nationally to income classes in pro­
portion to total federal taxes paid; CXj A represents the percent of fed­
eral tax revenue paid by income class J and raised in the region; ^repre­
sents the percent of nonreimbursable federal tax cost; and (£) represents 
the percent of reimbursable federal tax cost. Zjl, then, represents 
the present value investment cost of the project ut>rn by the regional 
component of income class J if that cost is distributed in proportion to 
the federal tax structure. In other words, ZVis the total cost, due 
to both taxes and reimbursement (but without double counting), of a pro­
ject to a region. The formula assumes that reimbursement will not exceed 
federal tax cost on a present value basis.
Because a regional analysis was desired for purposes of this test, 
the modified form of equation 8 will be used in the following evaluation.' 
The model was implemented for a region surrounding the actual project 
site and associated downstream locations, defined by zip code areas 263 
and 2 6 k . The advantage of such a definition is that all flood control 
and water supply benefits of the project and a majority of the recreation 
impacts accrue to this region. Moreover, data questions were simplified 
to some extent by such a choice. Fundamentally, however, in view of the 
local impact of the reimbursement requirements, the-absolute bulk of any 
distributional impacts will fall in this region. The major change which 
would take place by analyzing such effects from a national view point would 
be a required allocation to income classes of both the non-reimbursable 
tax costs which fall outside the region and a portion of recreation bene­
fits. As indicated earlier, if the budget can be assumed fixed, the im­
pact of taxes on relative distribution will be zero. Thus, the change 
dn relative impact over that obtained from the regional view point would 
be small and the absolute impact of the project on national income dis­
tribution would be infinitesimal due to relative project size.
Initial Income Distribution: Obviously the first step in the analy­
sis is to define the present distribution of personal income in the re­
gion. The income base utilized was that of adjusted gross income for the 
year 1966 as obtained from federal tax returns, 79 The initial income dis­
tribution within the region is presented in Table Data limitations per­
mitted only three income classes to be defined.
Benefit and Cost Allocation by Function: In order to dec ermine the
net present value of the distributional effects of a project by income 
classes, it is necessary to allocate a project's benefits and costs to 
each of its primary functions. For example, the costs and benefits for 
the flood control function and the distribution effect of this function 
must be quantified separately from the other functions. This procedure 79
79 . . .Since the analysis was to be carried out using household income
as the income base, it was assumed that the tax returns represented 
household income. However, such an estimate has a downward bias because 
of the use of separate returns within households. Data to make the neces­
sary adjustments or improved sources of. information were not available, 
however.
In
TABLE k
INITIAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION FOR ZIP CODE AREA 263~26t
Class
% of Population 
in Class
% of Adjusted Gross In­
come in Class
$ 3,000 26 11
3,000-
10,000 63 62
> 10,000 11 27
Source: U. S. Internal Revenue Service, Zip Code Area Data
Individual Income Tax Returns, Supplement Statistics of Income, 1966, 
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969).
is necessary primarily Because Benefits arising from one function are 
distriButed to income classes differently than the Benefits arising from 
another. Also, cost distributions can change Because of reimbursement 
policy. The net effects of the separate functions are then summed for 
each income class to determine the total distributional effect of a project
The magnitude of project Benefits and costs for the proposed Stonewall 
Jackson Reservoir, as originally estimated By the Corps, are given By 
function in Senate Document 109* The procedure used for allocation of 
total project costs to individual functions was the "separable cost- 
remaining Benefit" method. Neither this procedure nor any other method 
used for the distribution of joint costs, however, can Be grounded in 
economic theory.60 other methods could Be used and would result In dif­
ferent distributions of joint costs to project functions. A different 
distribution would normally result in the calculation of a different in­
come distribution effect since methods of reimbursement will vary among 
functions. Thus, the estimation of a project's equity impact is depen­
dent on the method of allocation used for joint costs (when they exist 
and when non-proportional reimbursement occurs). However, Because 
actual reimbursement requirements are Based on the "separable cost-re­
maining Benefit" method and Because only reimbursement will alter the al­
location of costs to income groups, this conclusion will not affect the 
analytical results as long as the evaluation is consistent and utilizes 
the same approach for joint cost allocation. Thus, the separable cost- 
remaining Benefit approach will Be used in this test.
In any case, the original allocation of costs to functions as pre­
sented in Senate Document 109 was modified Because of the change In the 
discount rate used for evaluation from 3 l A  percent to 4 7/8 percent
80Eckstein, ch. IX.
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and to allow for modification of project benefits as discussed under the 
national economic efficiency account. Since the cost allocation results 
of the separable cost-remaining benefit procedure vary depending upon 
the magnitude of benefits arising from each function and because the 
functional benefits were altered in the reevaluation of the project, 
the allocation of costs to project function was changed. Appendix 1 
shows the calculations for allocation of joint costs based upon the modi­
fied benefit and cost estimates. Table 5 presents a summary of the bene­
fits and costs associated with each function of the project, A
■ TABLE 5
BENEFITS AND COSTS BY PROJECT FUNCTION- 
STONEWALL JACKSON RESERVOIR
Function
Average Annual 
Benefit (a)
Investment 
Cost (b)
Average Annual 
Operating & Main­
tenance Cost (c)
Flood Control $765,000 $ 29,108,200 $ 69,300
Water Supply 191,900 1 ,796,800 -7,600
Recreation Vf9,000 5,521,000 102,000
Source: (a) Senate Document 109 as modified.
(b) Appendix 1.
(c) Appendix 1 . Negative costs arise from the nature 
of the separable cost-remaining benefit method when 
used with an economically inefficient project. In 
essence, one function is subsidizing another.
Average annual benefits and operating and maintenance costs were, 
then, discounted to present value, as required by the model, using a 
k 7/8 percent discount rate and a 100 year time horizon for all functions. 
The necessary discounting required to implement the reimbursement portion 
of equation 8 also used a k 7/8 percent discount rate, but the time hori­
zon was shortened to 50 years in accordance with the appropriate public 
laws concerning reimbursement. Given the appropriate present values, 
benefits and costs can be allocated to income classes. This will be 
undertaken next.
Allocation of Investment Costs to Income Classes: Because the evalu­
ation is being carried out for a region rather than the nation, the invest­
ment cost of each function must be allocated to the various income classes 
in accordance with equation 9. In other words, the actual cost of the pro­
ject, if it were paid in proportion to the federal tax structure, to 
income groups within the region is a function of the percentage of federal 
taxes paid by the groups and the degree of reimbursement required.
8lTitle III, PL. 85-500 ammended by Section 10 of PL. 87-88,
Since the federal tax costs* Zjj, of each function (or more generally 
of the total project) are raised from general federal revenues* they can 
he allocated to national income classes on the basis of an allocation of 
federal taxes to income classes. A recent allocation of the federal tax 
burden by income classes, published by the Tax Foundation in 19&7> was 
utilised for this purpose.&2 The percentage of federal taxes allocated 
to the income groups defined for this study is presented in Table 6.
TABLE 6
ALLOCATION OF FEDERAL TAX TO NATIONAL INCOME GROUPS, 1966
Class
Average Federal Tax 
Per Family (a)
Households in 
Nation (b)
Total Tax in . 
Nation
% o f  Federal 
Tax paid by 
Income Class
$ < 3,000 $ 267 11,293,320 $ 2,981,1+36,780 2%
3,000-
10,000 1,317 32,717,160 73,088,799,720 33%
=-10,000 5,637 1**,951,310 87,280,537,770 ' 65%
Source: (a) Tax Foundation, Tables B-8 and B--9, JtT-W.
(b) U. S. Internal Revenue Service, Zip Code Area Data,- 1. Total
exemptions in each income class divided by 3*29 people per household. 
Assumes that household and family definitions are identical. (Note: 
Average federal tax per family excludes social insurance since it is 
not part of revenue from which investment funds are drawn. )
Several problems arise from this tax allocation procedure. For 
example, the income base is defined differently in the Tax Foundation study 
than in the zip code data. However, the difference is not expected to 
substantially bias the quantitative results. Another problem is that 
the average federal tax per family in Table 6 is based on I960 data 
while the numbers of households in the nation are based on 1966 data. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the tax structure was unchanged from i960
to 1966.
Also, it should be noted that the assumptions of tax incidence 
used in the Tax Foundation study are crucial to the results. For ex­
ample, "the most crucial assumption in the tax allocation is that the 
burden of most business, excise, and sales taxes is shifted forward to 
the consumers. Many would argue that these taxes are at least par—
DpTax Foundation, Tax Burdens and Benefits of Government Expenditures 
by Income Class, 1961 and 1965, (New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 1967).
On
^Tax Foundation, 76.
tially shifted to the factors of production. If different tax inci­
dence assumptions were to he used, different empirical results would 
he obtained from this study.
The investment cost of each project function assigned to each na­
tional income class was determined hy multiplying the percentages in 
Table 6 by total investment cost. This calculation resulted in the dis­
tribution of total investment cost (Z^). However, it is, the distri­
bution of regional costs that is desired, so the portion of the total 
investment cost that is born by the region must be determined. That 
proportion must be determined by using equation 9-
For flood control, ( j ) is equal to zero and, therefore, ^  is equal 
to 100 percent. Thus, if OCjl is known the investment cost born by 
each Income class in the region (ZjJ|),can be derived. The 0Cjl 
values were determined by calculating the amount of total federal Income 
taxes paid by the respective' regional income classes as a percent of 
total federal income taxes paid hy the corresponding national classes.®^ 1 
The resulting regional costs for flood control are displayed in Table 7-
Although the investment costs for water supply are initially paid 
from federal revenue, the Federal Water Supply Act stipulates that 100 
percent of the total investment cost must be repaid to the federal 
government with interest at h 7/8 percent on the unpaid balance over a 
50-year period. Therefore, Q ) is equal to 100 percent and Zj\ is equal 
to the investment cost of the: function times the percent of Tederal 
taxes paid by the appropriate national income class (Table 6). This 
provides the cost of investment to the regional income classes when 
reimbursement Is proportional to the federal tax structure. The appro­
priate values are displayed in Table 7-
The Federal Recreation Act stipulated that 50 percent of the se­
parable investment cost of recreation be repaid to the federal govern­
ment with interest at U 7/8 percent on the unpaid balance over a 50- 
year period. Thus, ( j ) is equal to 25-6 percent and to 7^ -*^ - percent 
based on separable costs of $l,Ul5,000 and total costs of $5,521,000. 
Using the appropriate Zjjj and CXjl values gave the results shown in 
Table 7 . A
Allocation of Costs and Benefits by Function to Income Classes,: Due
to the varied allocation procedures used for annual variable costs and 
for benefits, the methodology utilized will be discussed by function.
Flood Control: Data--concerning, the distribution of flood control bene­
fits of the project to income classes were nonexistant. However, a 
personal tour of the-project site and flood control area revealed that 
flood control benefits would most probably accrue to Income groups in. 
proportion to the initial income distribution of the region. The flood
U. 8. Internal Revenue Service. The percentages were .07 percent; 
.07 percent and .03 percent for the under $3 ,000, $3-10,000, and over 
$10,000 classes, respectively.
1*5
TABLE T
ALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT.COSTS BY FUNCTION AND INCOME CLASS
Class Function
Investment Cost Born 
by Nation (Z )u JM
Investment Cost Born 
by Region (Z^)
$ -=3,000 Flood Control $ 582,161* $ 1*08
3,000-
10,000 9,605,706 6,72t
=-10,000 18,920,330 5,676
-=3,000 Water Supply 35,936 35,936
3,000-
10,000 592,9V 592,91A
=-10,000 1 ,167,920 1 ,167,920
-=3,000 Recreation 110,U20 28,357
3,000-
10,000 1,821,930 1*67,898
=-10,000 3,588,650 920,551
Source: Tables 5 and 6.
control Benefits forecast from the project are $1 5,558,598 on a present 
value "basis.
The costs associated with flood control consist of allocated invest­
ment costs and allocated operation and maintenance costs. Investment 
costs were distributed to income groups in the region in Table 7* The 
present value of annual operation and maintenance costs is $1,1*09,1*23 
and the appropriate portions were distributed to income groups in the 
region on the same basis as investment costs. The overall income distri­
bution effect of the flood control function is presented in Table 8.
Water Supply: Water supply benefits were distributed to income classes on
the basis of water expenditure by income class as a proxy for the amount of 
water used by each class. The calculations are shown in Tables 9 and 10.
Investment costs for water supply were distributed to the regional 
income classes in Table 7* It was assumed that the required 100 percent 
repayment would be financed by the locality through water charges and 
that the repayment would be in equal amounts over the entire 50-year 
period. The annual repayment with interest on the unpaid balance is 
approximately $97,000 per year. This amount was distributed on the 
basis of the percent of average water expenditures incurred by each
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DISTRIBUTION OF NET BENEFITS 
FROM FLOOD CONTROL BY REGIONAL INCOME CLASSES
' ■ TABLE 8
- Class’ Benefits Investment Cost
Operation & 
Maintenance
Present Val. 
Net Benefits
$-=3,000 $4,045,235 $ 408 $ 20 $4,044,807
1—1 ■ 0
 00 0 
0 
.0
 0
 
0 
0
9,801,917 6,724 326 9,794,867
> 10., 000 1,711,446 5,676 275 1.705.U95
TABLE 9
DISTRIBUTION OF WATER SUPPLY EXPENDITURES BY INCOME CLASS
;Class
Average Water Expen 
Per Household
.. - Households' 
in Region
Tot. Water 
Expend.
%. Water 
Expenditure
$.-■*3,000 $ 7-5 9,775 . $ 73,313 ■ 11 ■
- 3,000- 
- 10,000 17.1 23,484 401,576 62
> 10,000 40.0 4,256 170,240 26 '
Source: ■ U. S. Department of Labor, BLS, Survey of Consumer Ex­
penditure 196Q-61, Supplement #3 to BLS Report No. 237-86, Consumer 
.Expenditures and Income, Rural & Farm areas in Southern Region, 1961, 
'■.(Washington: U. S* Government Printing Office, 1965).
income class.' In other words, the actual reimbursement cost was distri­
buted to regional income classes in the same manner in which benefits were 
distributed.'
Operation and maintenance costs are by law paid by the locality, so 
it was' also assumed that these costs would be born by regional income 
classes according to their water expenditures. The results of the calcu­
lations using these assumptions and the distribution o.f the present value 
of net benefits is presented in Table 11.
Recreation: Recreation benefits were distributed to income classes on
the basis of the percentage of visitors to federal reservoirs by income 
classes in i960. The percentages and resulting calculations are given in
TABLE 10
DISTRIBUTION OF WATER SUPPLY BENEFITS BY INCOME CLASS
Class
Present Value of
% of Water Present Value of Benefit to In- 
Expenditures Water Supply Benefits come Class
$ < 3,000 11 $3,902,861+ $ 1+29,315
3,000-
10,000 62 2,1+19,776
=-10,000 26 1 , o i l ) ,71+5
TABLE 11
DISTRIBUTION OF NET BENEFITS 
FROM WATER SUPPLY BY REGIONAL INCOME CLASS
Class
Gross
Benefit
Investment
Cost
Reimbursement Operation 
Adjustmenta Cost
Present 
Value of 
Net Benefits
$ *«3, 000 $ 1+29,315 $ 35.936 $+162,507 $-17,003 $ 21+7,875
3,000-
10,000 2,1+19,776 592,91+1+ +523,61+2 -95 ,835 1,399,025
=-10,000 l,0i^,T1i5 1 ,1 6 7 ,9 2 0 _70E,20l+ -1+0,189 591,218
aDoes not add to zero due to rounding.
Table 12. However, Table 12 results in an allocation of total recreation 
benefits to the region. Obviously only a portion of these benefits 
accrue to those people who live in the region. For the purpose of this 
test, it -vras. assumed that 50 percent of the recreation benefits accrue 
to the people of the region selected for study.  ^ Therefore, the rele­
vant benefit value accruing to each class is 50 percent of that reported 
in Table 12.
Recreation costs involve all three cost components. The distri­
bution of the regional investment costs to income classes was given in 85
85This figure was based upon an estimate made by the Pittsburg Dis­
trict Office of the Army Corps of Engineers.
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TABLE 12
DISTRIBUTION OF- TOTAL RECREATION BENEFITS BY INCOME" CLASS
Class % of Visitors
Present Value of 
Recreation Benefit
Benefit to 
Income Class
j1 o 
! o 
, o! 00 V-ea 1.5% $9,741,919 $ 730,644
3,000-
10,000 71.8# 6,99^ ,698
=-10,000 20.7% 2,016,577 :
Source: Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, Reports No.:
5 and 20, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office).
Tahle 7* Assuming repayment is in equal installments over the entire 
time horizon, the annual amount to he repaid is $77,000. The law sti- >, 
pulates that the source of repayment must he limited to entrance and user 
fees collected at the project. (it is also possible to have repayment 
in the form of lands, hut this possibility is ignored here.) Therefore., 
the $77,000 is distributed to income classes on the basis of reservoir 
use by income classes.
Operation and maintenance costs are paid entirely by user fees, so 
these costs are also allocated on the basis of reservoir use by income 
class. However, because only 50 percent of total visitation was of a 
regional origin, only 50 percent of these costs were included in the 
calculations. The net benefit distribution effect of the recreation 
function is presented in Table 13-
TABLE 13
DISTRIBUTION OF NET BENEFITS 
FROM RECREATION BY REGIONAL INCOME CLASS
Class Benefit
Investment
Cost
Reimbursement
Adjustment
Operating
Costs
Present Value 
Net Benefits
$ -<3,000 $ 365,322 $ 28 ,357 $ +78,837 $ 77,793 $ 180,335
i—1 0 
00
u 0
 0
 
0 
0 
0 
0 1
3 , k 9 1 , 3 h 9 467,898 +556,147 744,740 1 , 128, 56k
^ 10,000 1 ,008,288 920,551 -634,974 214,709 508,002
b9
Other Impacts: Although the effects of the so-called expansion or se­
condary impacts'were previously discussed and eliminated from the analysis, 
two other impacts have not been considered. The first is the possible 
impact of the project on regional growth and the subsequent distributional 
effects. For reasons which have been outlined in the section on economic 
efficiency, this was not considered an important aspect of water resource 
projects. Moreover, the data requirements necessary to trace the distri­
butional consequences of any such impact would be insurmountable for an 
evaluation like this one. Therefore, it was not considered in the analysis. 
Second, the employment impact of the project, which was also discussed in 
the previous section, obviously has distributional impacts that have not 
been accounted for. The average annual employment impact was estimated 
at $137>00O for the entire project. The regional portion of that figure, 
however, is estimated to be less than 25 percent or $3^,250 annually.
To this must be added an unknown multiplier component which could range 
as high as 2.36.°? This would all be a net gain to the income classes 
concerned (presumably the lowest income group because of the unemployment 
although this may not be the case if the unemployment was of short dur­
ation or seasonal). An offsetting influence on the region though was 
the $111,000 annual loss of land productivity estimated in the Corps’ re­
port. This would all accrue to the region but its distributional charac­
teristics are unknown. Thus, the two effects were assumed to produce 
roughly offsetting distributional impacts on the region and were both 
eliminated from further analysis.
Summary and Conclusions: The total net benefit distribution of the Stone­
wall Jackson project can now be shown and is presented in Table I k .  The 
project has a positive effect on all income classes in the defined re­
gion because the region is not required, through either taxes or reim­
bursement, to pay even a major share of project costs. This is true even 
though the project from the national efficiency viewpoint is inefficient. 
The relative distribution of benefits tends to favor the middle income 
group with 61 percent of the total but the upper income class receives 
the largest absolute value per household at $659-of present valuevimpacts. 
Conversely, the lower income group receives the lowest absolute value per 
household. Table 15 compares the relative distribution of income in the 
region before the project with the regional distribution of project 
benefits. The project would result in a slight distribution effect in 
favor of the lower income group. The results are of course valid only for 
the specific region defined and under the assumptions outlined.
® Determined by estimating the percent of total unemployed labor 
potentially affected by the project that resided in the region. Corps 
of Engineers, West Fork River..., Appendix X.
^Robert R. Nathan Associates Inc., and Resource Planning Associates, 
Recreation as an Industry in Appalachia, Prepared for the Appalachian 
Regional Commission (Washington, D. C.: December 1966).
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NET BENEFIT DISTRIBUTION OF 
THE STONEWALL JACKSON PROJECT BY REGIONAL INCOME CLASS
TABLE l 7
Class
Present Value of 
.Net Benefit
$ of Net Benefits 
by Income Class
Net Benefits per 
Household
$ -*3,000 $ 7,773,017 22$ $758
fo o 
o o 
o o ■
on o 1—] 12,922,756 67$ 550
=>-10,000 2,80lt,.715
1—1 659
Total 20,200,188 100$
Source: Tables 8, 11, 13 and. U. S. Internal Revenue Service,
Households in the region number 9,775, 23,787 and 7,256 for the respective 
income classes
TABLE 15
INCOME DISTRIBUTION EFFECT 
OF THE STONEWALL JACKSON PROJECT
Percent of Adjusted Gross Percent Net Bene-
Class Income in Class (a) fits in Class (b)
$-=3,000 11 22$
3,000-
10,000 62
\o
=-10,000 27 17$
(a) Source: Table 7.
(b) Source: Table l7.
THE REGIONAL ACCOUNT
As the Tash Force indicates the regional account must be carefully 
defined before analysis can proceed. The objectives of such an account 
could embrace "several types of goals ranging from increased total re­
gional income, improved geographic distribution of economic activity,
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enhancement of the regional economic base, or improved income distri­
bution within the region itself.Moreover, the objectives can change 
depending on the scope of the region considering the problem. For ex­
ample, the nation would likely have a somewhat different view of a pro­
posal for a defined region then the region itself. The Task Force sug­
gests that the regional income objective "will be the most critical."
In support of this they also point out that the other aspects mentioned 
as being important to the regional account, will be reflected in the en­
vironmental and/or well being accounts. ^
This implies that use of regional income would receive approval as 
an indicator of regional progress from a wider set of interest groups and 
that a regional viewpoint of the situation is implicitly accepted. In 
other words, the region’s view of its own welfare rather than the nation’s 
is the most important criterion and is reflected by total regional income. 
Some have accepted this as a basis for regional analysis. Others, how- . 
ever, view the .situation slightly differently. Perloff points out that 
measures of regional growth encompass the concepts of both "volume" and 
" w e l f a r e . F o r  example, total sales, income and employment in the re­
gion as well as per capita real income, its changes and stability may be 
important. What needs to be noted is that a linear relationship does 
not necessarily exist between those measures associated with volume and 
those related to welfare. Obviously, however, use of per capita measures 
would provide a relative gauge among alternatives and would, thus, be 
a better indicator of project ranking for this objective both within a 
given region and between regions of various physical and economic sizes. 
The latter is especially important since regional size will influence 
the absolute size of project benefits and costs. In any case, regional 
per capita income or employment effects can easily be determined from 
total impacts and, therefore, the measurement methodology discussed below 
will concentrate on absolute effects that can be forecast with, as opposed 
to without, a proposed project. Displays, however, should be structured 
in terms of the true measure of economic progress - increased per capita 
income - as well as total regional income.
The analysis of a proposed project for a regional account, defined 
along the lines of either total or per capita regional income, can
88 J Water Resources Council, Procedures for Evaluation . . ., 111.
89yIbid, 112.
^°For example, see: John V. Krutilla, "Criteria for Evaluating Re­
gional Development Programs," American Economic Review, XLV (May 1955),
pp. 120-132.
Julius Margolis, "Secondary Benefits, External Economics, and the 
Justification of Public Investment," Review of Economics and Statistics, 
XXXXX (August 1957), PP- 28^-91-
91Harvey S. Perloff, How a Region Grows, Area Development in the 
U, S. Economy, (Supplemental Paper No. 17, published by the Committee for 
Economic Development, March 1963).
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logically be separated into four component parts. First, the net primary 
national income benefits which accrue to the region(s) must be measured. : 
Such a measurement would include a reduction in national benefits to 
account for leakages, local taxes and local contributions or other reim­
bursement. ;Second, employment benefits resulting from the utilisation 
of unemployed labor should be evaluated. These would be similar to the 
types of impacts considered under the national economic efficiency ac­
count but would, include only impacts, falling within the region or regions 
being analysed. Third, the change in regional growth and its subsequent 
effect on regional income as a result of a project should be considered. 
Again, this component is the regional complement of the "use externalities 
idea considered under the national economic efficiency account. In fact, 
the three components of the regional account listed above all correspond 
to. elements of an efficiency analysis. That is why the Task Force suggest 
that: - "It may be useful, as an evaluation technique, to consider, when 
measuring income gains, the region as the nation (as a closed economy) 
and apply the basic evaluation principals and techniques set forth in 
the measurement'of the national income benefits."9^ The fourth component 
of the regional account is, however, dependent on the other three and 
is normally not included in a national analysis because it is usually 
only a regional transfer. This impact is the so-called multiplier or 
expansion results of initial or direct effects such as those occurring 
under the other components. For example, the positive impacts of rec­
reation development and the negative effects of farm land inundation may 
be important to regional income. To the extent that these are retained 
in the region they are a real regional impact even though a pecunary im­
pact from the national viewpoint.
The following discussion will follow the above format. First, 
however, an issue overriding all of the above must be considered and 
resolved. That issue is the one of regional definition.
.Regional Definition: Regional definition for purposes of project evalu­
ation is primarily a value judgement that must be made by the analyst. 
However, the result of that judgement has important implications. For 
example, the magnitude of regional income benefits can be very sensitive 
to the economic size of the region. Thus, as has been pointed out else­
where, the "size of a region can' be arbitrarily varied so as to adversely 
affect the computation of regional benefits from viable alternatives 
which differ in nature or location from a given course of action."93 More 
over, projects can be constructed outside the region they are supposed 
to benefit. As an example, the Corps of Engineers have proposed a 
series of structures for the Potomac River headwaters as a means of 
alleviating..pollution downstream near Washington, D. C. What region or 
regions are appropriate for regional analysis in such a situation?
The latter case brings into shape focus the problem of interre­
gional transfers. As Castle has pointed out: 923
92Water, Resources Council, Procedures for Evaluation..,., 113.
93 .Kalter, et. al., Criteria for Federal Evaluation..., 9*
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A system of-regional accounts might Toe established that would 
make explicit the regional transfers of income that accompany 
the development of such projects. If it is relevant to know how 
much a region benefits from a project, it is also relevant to 
know which regions, if any, have sacrificed potential benefits 
to make this possible.y
Thus,- the regional account should show, for example, not only the impacts 
of the western reclaimation project on the region containing the project 
but on the Mississippi delta county where returns to cotton production 
could be adversely affected. Pointing this out., however, does not take 
us very far in our quest for a means to define the region or system 
of regions to be used in an analysis. Nor does it leave us overly comfor­
table with the Task Force suggestion that the OBERS regions be used for 
this purpose since their correspondence to a judgement about the signi­
ficant are-a(s) needed in the evaluation may be weak or they may be incom­
patible with other data sources.
As Meyer has commented:
Traditionally three different approaches have been used in de­
fining regions. The first stresses homogeneity with respect 
to some one or combination of physical, economic, social or other 
characteristics; the second emphasizes so-called nodality or 
polarisation, usually around some central urban place; and the 
third is programming- or policy-oriented, concerned mainly with 
administrative coherence or identity between the area being 
studied and available political institutions for effectuating 
policy decisions. . . .  regional definitions as established in 
practice often represent a compromise between these different pure 
types. In particular, availability- and limitations of data 
can and do dictate departures. . ,
Strictly speaking, however', the three traditional defini­
tions of regional type are not mutually exclusive. . . . all re­
gional classification schemes are simply variations: of the homo­
geneity criterion . . .95
Thus, we are left with the need to make the value judgement. Perhaps 
the best -guideline to use in this process is to specify that areas im­
pacted differentially by a project should be isolated as separate regions. 
For the Stonewall Jackson project, this implies a '‘close in'1 impact area 
(an area where the majority of the primary benefits will accrue) plus 
a somewhat broader or intermediate sized region to cover the area pri­
marily concerned with recreation opportunities at the reservoir. The 
intermediate region could coincide with the State of West Virginia be­
cause of the reimbursement requirements for recreation components of *95
9^Emery N. Castle, Testimony presented to the Water Resources Council 
Hearings, in Portland, Oregon, August 11, 1969, mimeo.
95John R. Meyer, "Regional Economics: A Survey," American Economic
Review, LIII, No. 1 (March 1963), p. 22.
5^
federal projects or it could cover parts of a multi-state area where the 
potential reservoir users reside. This region would differ from the "im­
pact area" in that it would receive an additional portion of the primary 
recreation benefits and bear an increased part of project costs. The 
other categories of impacts, mentioned above, would appear to be rela­
tively minor. Finally a third region for a systems of regional accounts 
could be identified which would, include the remaining parts of the nation 
The analysis of such a region would be characterized by the absence of 
any substantial beneficial impacts of the proposal and the requirement 
of bearing major portions of the forecast costs.
For purposes of evaluation, the "impact" region for the Stonewall 
Jackson project was chosen and defined to include the region covered by 
the 263-264 zip code area. This area surrounds the project site and in­
cludes all the land and communities affected by the water supply and 
flood control components. The definition is also consistent with that 
used for the evaluation of the well-being account. In addition to an 
evaluation for the impact area, a summary will be made of the project 
impacts on an Intermediate region defined as the remaining portions of 
the State of West Virginia. Wo quantification of the project cost to 
the rest of the nation will be undertaken.
Regional "Primary" Impacts: It goes without saying that net national
income benefits resulting from the primary outputs of a project are 
also real gains to a defined region to the extent that their incidence 
(as opposed to initial impact) falls within that area. Thus, the problem 
becomes the empirical one of separating efficiency benefits and costs 
by region and calculating the net regional impact. However, issues of 
reimbursement complicate the analysis in the same way as for the per­
sonal income distribution model. Because of this, the model previously 
outlined and used for that account can. also be used, with a slight modi­
fication, to determine regional impacts of primary outputs. The modi­
fication required is one which permits benefits and costs to be aggre­
gated across income classes to obtain the overall regional effect.
Since the region being analyzed for this test is the same for both ac­
counts, the empirical results given in the previous section can also be 
utilized here. Table 16 displays these results and the aggregated totals 
for the region. It was assumed that the regional impact of project ef­
fects also denoted regional Incidence or that impacts were not shifted 
between regions.
Regional Employment Impacts: As indicated previously, the benefits stem­
ming from the project’s use of unemployed labor were forecast to be 
$1373000 annually.9° However, the regional impact was estimated at 
only $34,250^7 annually or $696,578 on a present value basis. This 
figure was added to the regional benefit values.
96 1 'See pages 24 to 27, above.
97See footnote 86.
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PRESENT VALUE REGIONAL IMPACTS 
FROM PRIMARY FUNCTIONS - STONEWALL JACKSON RESERVOIR
TABLE 16
Function
Present Value 
Gross 
Benefits
Present Value 
Costs3,
Present Value 
Net Benefits
Flood Control^ $15,558,598 $ 13,b29 $15,5^5,169
Water Supply0 3,863,836 1,625,718 2 ,238,118
Recreation^ b,870,959 2,15^,058 2 ,Ul6 ,901
Total 2b ,293,393 b, 093,205 20,200,188
includes investment costs and operation, maintenance and repair 
costs,
^Source: Table 8.
cSource: Table 11.
^Source; Table 13-
Regional Growth Impacts: The effects of water projects on national
growth (through productivity change) were discussed conceptually in a 
previous section.98 It was concluded that "only if a strong a priori 
case can be made that shortages of water services act as a constraint 
on more optimal production or that a water project will bring about tech­
nological change" should an analysis of the needed demand and cost func­
tions be undertaken. Since these factors were not present in the Stone­
wall Jackson project further analysis to quantify such national growth 
impacts was not carried out. Absence of growth'impacts at the national 
level implies a similar situation at the regional level. Thus, no 
further analysis was attempted on this aspect of the regional account 
and net benefits from it were assumed to be aero. However, an annual 
land productivity loss of $111,000 was forecast by the Corps study re­
port. This would all accrue to the region and, therefore, the $2,257,52b 
of present value impact was included as a negative benefit for the re­
gional evaluation. Note, also, that the type of economic growth consid 
ered here was that: which would come about'because of changes in tech­
nology and the resulting change in productivity. If increased regional 
income is the goal, it can come about in another way. This will be 
considered next. 98
98 ,. See pages 23 to 2t, above.
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Regional Multiplier Impacts: The .multiplier or expansion impacts of
direct (initial) project effects can he important regional gains or 
losses although they are normally considered a transfer payment from 
the national point of view.99 Formerly described as "secondary bene­
fits these impacts refer to the round by round respending effects of 
alternative courses of public action.
However, their quantification, through such, techniques as inter­
industry analysis,10^ can lead to the measurement of artificial growth 
impacts. This stems from our definition of regional growth and the as­
sumption made concerning regional employment. If full employment is 
projected for the region over the project's time horizon, multiplier 
effects can merely result in a labor inflow to the region with no neces­
sary improvement in regional per capita incomes. On the other hand, 
if full employment is not forecast or if slack (underemployment) exists 
in the regional labor markets, multiplier impacts can cause a real 
change in regional per capita incomes. Also, a redistribution of labor 
resources toward higher valued occupations because (of the project could 
result in improvement in the average per capita income regardless of 
the rate of unemployment.
Thus, if per capita rather than total regional income is important, 
the assumptions the analyst makes on these issues is critical to the 
evaluation results. Moreover, most empirical situations would tend to 
present a mixture of conditions rather than one of the polar cases out­
lined above. Little research exists to resolve this problem. From 
observation, the impact area of the Stonewall Jackson project would ap­
pear to be one of some labor underemployment, especially in specific *10
Only when less than full employment conditions prevail are such 
effects considered a real national gain. Employment impacts have been 
previously considered, however.
100 ■For further discussion of the use of interindustry models as a 
means of quantifying the secular growth in regional income due to public 
investment, see:
Robert J. Kalter and William B. Lord, "Measurement of the Im­
pact of Recreation Investments on a Local Economy," Am. Jour, of Agr. 
Econ., Vol. 50, Ho. 2 (May, 1968), pp. 2^3-256.
Robert J. Kalter, An Interindustry Analysis of the Central 
Hew York Region, Bulletin 1025 (Ithaca, H. Y,: Cornell University
Agricultural Experiment Station, May 1969).
Brian J. L. Berry, Strategies, Models, and Economic Theories of 
Development in Rural Regions, Agricultural Economic Report Ho. 127, 
Economic Research Service, U.S.D.A., Dec. 1967.
Werner Z. Hirsch, "Input-Output Techniques for Urban Government 
Decisions," Amer. Econ. Rev., Vol. 58, No. 2 (May 1968), pp. 162-170.
E. M. Lofting, The Leontief Input-Output System and Its Appli­
cation to Analysis and Projection for Water Resources Planning, Water 
Resources Proj., Dept, of Civil Engin., Univ. Calif., Berkeley, Mimeo.
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economic sectors. Given the obvious value judgements required, however, 
a sensitivity analysis of this type of impact would appear beneficial.
In any case, the distributional impacts of the project within the 
region from the standpoint of economic sectors (as opposed to personal 
income groups) may be of importance for political and cost sharing rea­
sons. The most empirically workable model to estimate both distribu­
tional consequences and changes in total regional Income is that of Inter­
industry analysis.101 However, as Berry has pointed out:
The problems of this kind of analysis are many. Some are sim­
ilar to those of economic base analysis. Data on interindustry 
flows are scarce. Linear homogenous relationships do not neces­
sarily obtain, and technical coefficients may well be unstable 
through time. Production functions may be irregular and stepped 
or "lumpy" rather than continuous over time. On the other 
hand, the input-output method of analysis is more general than 
the economic base method. It spells out specific Multipliers 
for each industry. Hence, when used In the correct context, 
it may provide findings of considerable value.102 *
These conceptual issues, along with the fact that the model is usually 
applied by forecasting exogenously the changes in final demand resulting 
from a proposed governmental investment, raise a number of empirical 
problems to the use of the method. Some of these will be examined in 
more detail below. Yet, if our basic objective is to develop a proce­
dure to determine the direct, indirect and induced economic effects of 
government investment, this appears to be the best method currently 
available. As Kalter and Lord have stated:
When used in conjunction with other studies, [“Interindustry] 
models provide a practical tool which can be used to estimate 
the magnitude and distribution of’such economic effects. Given 
an independent estimate of the initial (direct) impact of a 
proposed investment, we can derive estimates of net regional 
benefits (regional benefits minus regional costs) from the in­
come transactions matrix of the . . . model and the associated 
inverse matrix and income multiplier values. More specifically, 
given adequate supporting data, we can estimate the regional 
benefits accruing during the year of model formulation as well 
as make projections of future benefits.103
10UOther than the conceptual problems of the model, several em-
101 Meyer.
102B^erry, 2o.
"*"°^ Kalter and Lord, 253-
“^ ^These issues are adequately discussed elsewhere. For example, see 
Hollis B. Chenery and Paul G. Clark, Interindustry Economics (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959)-
pirical problems attend its use for purposes of regional evaluation of 
proposed investments. First, the model is highly restrictive in terms 
of data requirements and can, thus, he both time consuming and expen­
sive to implement for regional areas. Use of national models is far 
from Satisfactory because of the need to ignore the trade relationships 
for the region, ho satisfactory answer to this problem is available.
A rough, approximation of regional multipliers can be obtained for a 
region by comparing it to a similar region(s) in economic size for which 
model;, have previously been derived. However, this is usually not a 
satisfactory method of determining impacts on the various economic sec­
tors because of regional differences.
Second, use of the multiplier values forthcoming from the model 
is; dependent on independently derived estimates of the magnitude of 
the direct (initial) effect of a proposed program. These estimates 
differ from the forecasts of primary project benefits since an actual 
increase in spending within the region, of non-regional funds, as a 
result of the project is needed to obtain any net regional increase. 
Anything else would merely be an intra-regional transfer.105 Thus, pro­
ject caused changes in regional production for export (including the 
"export" of recreation services to non-residents) and the increased 
expenditure of non-regional funds on the project itself (construction 
and operation) need to be quantified before the multiplier values can 
be utilized. Of course similar impacts of a negative nature should also 
be analyzed. For example, how many businesses will the project elimi­
nate and what will be the.initial impacts of., such a reduction.
Finally, care must be taken to estimate only the net impacts of 
final demand changes to the region. The regional gain or loss is not 
the total value of the change in sales as a result of project construc­
tion but only the change in regional income.
For the impact area of the proposed Stonewall Jackson reservoir, 
the major monetary effect., resulting from the project, on businesses 
in the region would be caused by.the recreation component. An 
average annual visitation rate of 375,600 was forecast with 50 percent *106
However, if a project halts an outflow of funds due to non­
availability of facilities, a net regional gain could result. For . 
example, the provision of regional recreation facilities which would, 
retain the tourist dollar of residents within the region can be a re­
gional gain resulting from the project if it can be proved that the 
outflow would have continued without the project.
106.As already noted, the flood control and water supply components 
do not appear to be important factors in the production functions of 
regional industries. Moreover, it can be assumed that, aside from 
the employment impact, most of the income generated by project construc­
tion will accrue outside of the area because of the inherent leakages 
in this type■of activity.
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or 187,800 visitor days having their origin outside the region. As­
suming that the average transfer cost (out of the pocket costs for such 
items as gas, meals, lodging etc.) of a visitor day at a federal re­
servoir amount to $5.001°8 and that $2.50 of that expenditure is spent 
in the impact region, the annual increase in regional sales amounts to 
$169,500. However, if .only 10 percent of sales are retained in the 
region as increased income or value added, the net regional gain drops 
to $1+6,900 annually. To this can "be applied an income multiplier value 
for the appropriate change in final demand. No interindustry analysis 
exists for the region hut other studies on small regions have derived 
multiplier values from around t - 5 0  to 2,00.1U-^ ■ Taking the employment 
multiplier for the region derived by Nathan and Associates of 2.36110 
and using it as a proxy for value added gives a total annual change in 
regional income of $110,681+, However, due to the seasonal nature of 
the recreation industry and, its low wage structure, and because 
underemployment can not be assumed to exist in all the relevant economic 
sectors, only a portion of this total can be assumed to be retained 
within the region and added,'to per capita, income.' For purposes of this 
evaluation, this amount was estimated at $55,000. From this must be 
subtracted any negative impacts of the project on the region. No esti­
mate of such an impact was available nor can great confidence be placed 
on the leakage estimates. Thus, the sensitivity of the total regional 
impact to a 20 percent change in multiplier impacts was tested.
Summary: Table 17 summarizes the regional impact of the Stonewall
Jackson proposal. Using the assumptions and methods discussed above, 
a net gain of $19,757,836 to the "impact area" was forecast.112 The 
net gain excluding the multiplier impact was forecast at $18,639,212. 
Given the current population of the. region and under the assumption that
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10^It was assumed that the region has sufficient alternative faci­
lities to retain the 1&7,800 local visitor days within the region with­
out the project.
1 oQ
°See: Kalter and Gosse, Appendix M.
10^See: Kalter, An Interindustry Analysis of the Central New York
Region.
Hays B. Gamble and David L. Raphael, A Microregional Analysis 
of Clinton County, Pennsylvania (University Park': Penn. State Univ. ,
1965).
"^See footnote 87-
"^"hiobert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.
IIPA 20 percent adjustment in the multiplier impact would result 
in an approximate change (gain or loss) of $221,000 in the net impact. 
Thus, the evaluation results do not appear sensitive to reasonable er­
rors in forecasting this component nor in the assumption regarding the 
extent of regional underemployment,
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PRESENT VALUE REGIONAL IMPACTS 
OF THE PROPOSED STONEWALL JACKSON RESERVOIR
TABLE IT
Impact Benefits Costs Net Benefits
Primary $24,293,393 $4,093,205 $20,200,188
Employment 696,578 696,578
Growth -2,257,521* -2,257,521+
Subtotal 22,732,447 4,093,205 18,639,242
Multiplier8, 1,118,59!* 1 ,118,591*
Total 23,851,041 4,093,205 19,757,836
a0nly net income impact, based upon $55,000 annual increase,
is given.
it would remain constant over the project life, this averages out to 
approximately $527 and $497 per household, respectively. Both figures, 
however, are on a present value basis and the actual benefits would ac­
crue to the region over a 100 year period. The benefit-cost ratio to 
the region of the project, exclusing the multiplier impact, is 5.6.
Using similar methods to estimate the project impact on the State 
of West Virginia, exclusive of the 263-264 zip code area, resulted in 
the following present value benefit- estimates:
Primary Recreation Impact 
Employment Impact 
Growth Impact 
Subtotal
Est. Income Multiplier
$ 4,481,283 
2,092,734
6.574.017 
1 ,000,000
7.574.017
The State share of federal costs totals $2,446,917 on a present value 
basis. Thus, a net benefit of $5,127,100 or $4,127,100, depending on 
whether the multiplier impact is included, accrues to the State outside 
of the impact area. Because interindustry models for the specified re­
gions were not available, no attempt was made at showing the distri­
bution of net benefits among the economic sectors for either region.
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For any project, the environmental quality consequences can he^ex­
pressed through three basic mechanisms. The most general approach is 
one in which all the impacts of a proposed change are considered with 
respect to all the objectives of society. Conceptually, then, the goals 
of society are expressed as components of a social welfare function and 
the impacts of any change with respect to these goals are weighte y 
the preferences of society. The concept abstracts from a measure of - 
monetary value by assuming a measure of utility such as uti s. y _ 
means the social welfare gained from public goods can be expressed since 
the nature of such goods does not enable the market economy to alloca 
scarce resources so as to maximize social welfare.
The Task Force specifies the objectives of society to be four^in 
number with environmental quality being included. The problem is m  
defining the weights attached to the various goals and m  measuring the 
consequences of proposed investments to these goals. Considerations o 
measurement for environmental quality will he discussed later m  this 
section hut a discussion of social welfare weights will not he under- 
taken here. This topic is reserved to the final section.
Because of problems associated with the measurement of quality dif­
ferences with respect to the environment, the analyst of governmental 
investment has been restricted, at best, to placing monetary values on 
this type of impact. An environmental quality change is often classifie 
as a technological externality and measured in either physical or value 
terms. Once so classified and quantified, the impact can logically^be 
included as part of a henefit-cost analysis for the national economic 
efficiency account. Since a water development project may produce, as 
well as correct, adverse or beneficial effects on the environment, which 
in turn influence the consumption or production pattern of others due 
to physical linkages, the value of the externalities is a relevant con 
sideration. However, not all such impacts can be measured nor does sue 
a definition delimit the meaning of environmental quality. Thus, an 
economic efficiency analysis cannot fully express the environmenta 
quality effects. Because of this, a separate environmental account is 
justified in which the effects are specified m  physical, rather than 
value, terms.
In such an account the consequences of public investment on en- 
vironmental quality would be displayed in physical terms hut labeled as 
either beneficial or detrimental. No attempt should be made to present 
the consequences in terms of common values since, by definition this 
is not possible. The political decision maker, then, lqforced to ap 
ply a more general concept of social welfare. By accepting this method, 
the economic analyst is forced to admit that current measurement tech­
niques are insufficient to express quantitatively all the environmen a 
consequences. To the extent that such measurement is possible, the de 
rived information should be included in the evaluation display. How  ^
ever, the value measures should not be weighted more heavily than physi 
cal measures when decisions are made.
In the next section, the measurement of the different types of en­
vironmental consequences will be explored. This examination will show
e practical difficulties in evaluating'environmental quality through 
such mechanisms as welfare functions or economic efficiency analysis 
However, this is not to imply that quantification for such models is 
an unjustifiahie concern of the economic analyst, hut rather that much 
additional research must occur before these concepts can be incorporated 
into the political decision process as it affects environmental quality.
Measurement of Environmental Quality: Regardless of the method of viewing
environmental quality, exact physical measurements are required parti­
cularly for effects which are not readily observable. However, the state 
of knowledge with respect to the measurement of these effects is limited 
Above the physical measurements, the valuation of the effects for partial 
equilibriumanalyses presents additional problems. Considering each 
type of environmental effect separately, relevant factors with respect 
to measurement will be discussed.
The Preservation or Enhancement of Aesthetic Areas: Due to the
psychological nature of aesthetic pleasure, the measurement of the ef- 
ec of quality differences on the level of consumption is difficult 
One individual's enjoyment of nature may depend on the observation of 
plants and animals, while another may enjoy hiking because of his view 
of the mountains. With respect to the social welfare function, these.
ifferences could be measured because the individuals would gain a dif­
ferent level of utils from the experience depending on its nature In 
evaluating a project, the utility measure would provide a quantitative 
expression of the aesthetic value, of the area. The concepts of vi­
carious consumption and option demand could be measured from the utility 
functions. For any project, this type of effect would be calculated 
as the net change m  welfare. However, the most common quantitative 
measure of utility is willingness to pay because of the inability to 
quantify psychological relationships. When the analyst accepts willing­
ness to pay as the measure, the value of aesthetic quality is assumed 
to be reflected m  the price. However, willingness to pay measures 
could be obtained for both option and vicarious demand. The sum of the 
willingness to pay for physical, option, and vicarious enjoyment of 
an area is the measure^of the benefits, for a partial equilibrium analy­
sis. For cost quantification, the social resources are also valued in 
terms of utils and the cost of the project in a social welfare function 
is the^sum of values of various component resources. Similarly the 
costs m  the partial equilibrium analysis are the dollar prices’of the 
component resources from the market system.
The real difference between the social welfare concept and the 
benefit-cost concept is the failure of the latter to fully consider 
the effect of quality on the level of utility, from the he^oint of 
social welfare, the satisfaction from a recreation area may decreas ■ 
even if more activities were provided. ■ Consumption patterns may be 
changed^ so that society would gain a lower total utility from developed 
recreation^than from wild recreation. The necessity of this type of 
consideration arises because the market allocation system does not re­
flect aesthetic^ quality. Therefore, benefit-cost analysis cannot pro­
vide answers which go beyond the assumptions underlying the analyses.
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As an alternative, a display approach could he utilized. This 
approach assumes the observations of a naturalist would he more rele­
vant than those of a technically trained analyst. The naturalist who 
is spurred by philosophical values could prepare the display which 
would be a statement of the aesthetic qualities that would be destroyed 
if the project were constructed as well as those qualities which would 
be enhanced by construction. An example is a reservoir pro ject in 
which a picturesque hiking trail is inundated, but small islands suit­
able to primitive camping are developed. The tradeoff in this case 
must be made according to the personal preference of the decision-maker, 
however, the display will provide him with a more complete listing of 
these consequences■ The consequences that are significant in the area 
of the West Fork River will be presented later in this section.
Protection of Areas of Archaelogical, Historical, or Scientific 
Value: ■ The philosophical quality of life for any person, society, or 
mankind in general is dependent on those features of the past that de­
pict the movement of life. Therefore the destruction of archaelogical 
and historical areas which have been key steps in this movement should 
be considered in evaluating a water development project. Furthermore, 
the maintenance of areas of scientific importance must be evaluated 
A dollar measurement of the cost of utilizing an alternative area could 
serve as one measure of primary benefits. However, if the area is a 
unique natural laboratory, its protection should be valued highly and 
may not be capable of monetary quantification. However, if the area
is not unique in this regard, the value of its protection will be de­
creased.
For aesthetic quality, the protection of unique areas could be 
reflected in the utils of a social welfare function. Benefit-cost 
analysis, however, does- not reflect the entire social willingness to 
pay. Without a total measure of willingness to pay, the value of pro­
tecting these areas is unknown. The alternative is again to display 
the consequences in physical terms and leave the tradeoff decision to 
the political world. An adequate display of these consequences requires 
evaluation by trained historians and/or scientists. These experts 
would conceptually apply the criteria of authenticity, uniqueness, and 
essentiality as they examine the consequences of the project.
The Protection or Improvement of Water Quality: In the social wel­
fare model, these considerations are reflected in the value of social 
inputs and outputs. However, in the efficiency model, these relation­
ships are technological externalities - They represent differences be­
tween private costs and social costs and are not reflected in market 
prices. If a public action either produces or corrects the misallocation, 
the positive or negative benefits can conceptually be included in the 
gPPPciency account. However, not all of the externalities are measurable 
in value terms, Therefore, the environmental account should also dis­
play these consequences in physical terms. In other words, the valuation 
methods are such that physical consideration is justified. 15
115John V. Krutilla, "Conservation Reconsidered," American Eco­
nomic Review, Vol. LVII (Sept. 1967) PP- 777-86.
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Prevention of Erosion and the Restoration of Eroded Areas : This
type of environmental quality effeet.differs" from the" previous type in 
that the producer of the externality cannot he easily specified. The 
pattern of land use determines the influence of erosion on water quality. 
Therefore, all land users affect the quality of the water, hut measure­
ment of the individual user's effect is virtually impossible. If a 
water development project improves the ability of a group of individuals 
in a watershed to prevent erosion, the quality of the total water body 
is improved.- The increased water quality is reflected in the efficiency 
account as ^ increased value of other uses or as reduced cost of performing 
water quality maintenance activities. In mined areas, the problems of 
acid as well as erosion can be influenced by a water development project. 
In this case, the effect is also measured in economic terms as the in­
creased value of.production in the industries that benefit from the im­
proved water quality. On the other hand,.a water project may produce 
conditions which destroy an operative watershed area, thus making the 
water quality worse and reducing the level of activity in the other 
uses. Finally, if the project reduces the need for conservation acti­
vities, the amount of the decrease in these expenditures is a benefit 
of the proposed project. Alternatively, the project might require in­
creased conservation expenditures which would represent a negative bene-
These effects, then, can be considered in an efficiency analysis. 
However, the measurement problem is such that a physical display pro­
vides the political decision-maker with additional information for evalu­
ation.
Analysis_of the _Environmental Quality Account - Stonewall Jackson Reser-
vp_ir Project: Based on the discussion above, the various types of en-
vironmental effects from the proposed project will be presented as a 
display of beneficial and detrimental consequences. The display will 
be in physical terms. Previous sections have applied value measures to 
quality components when it was feasible. Because of the physical nature 
of the display, no discussion of the appropriate time horizon or dis­
count rate will be undertaken.
_Preservation or Enhancement of Aesthetic Areas : The dam on
the West Fork River at Brownsville, West Virginia, would destroy the 
picturesque wooded and grass hillsides of the area. However, these hill­
sides are not unique to the region. At the same time, the resulting 
reservoir could produce islands which have a primitive quality for camp—  
ing. ^Such a development would probably provide .greater total satisfaction 
than is presently being obtained. However, the knowledgeable observa­
tions of an experienced naturalist rather than this test team should 
confirm the above conclusion.
For this project, aesthetic quality is influenced by the type of 
outdoor recreation activity available. For instance, the project will 
Inundate 35*1 miles of low quality stream.fishery and produce a reser­
voir fishery of possibly medium quality. Therefore, the stream fisher­
man loses utility, while the reservoir fisherman gains. In general, one
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would. conclude that an increase in total utility due to improvement in 
fishery quality would, take place.
Protection of Areas of Archaelogical, Historical, or Scientific 
Value: The opinion of the National Park Service was that the area had
no archaelogical or historical character. However, a private research 
study designated six areas in the "basin that might "be important in this 
regard. Studies of this type could provide the decision-maker with fur­
ther insights about the area.
With respect to historical value, construction of the dam will 
inundate some established family farm operations which may have historical 
significance. An example is the Jewels’ family farm which has been lo­
cated in the West Fork valley since 1883.
From the scientific standpoint, the reservoir could serve as a lab­
oratory for studying the ecological process of eutrophication. The wild­
life mitigation area could serve researchers in studies of succession 
and adaptation. Since this area as well as the lake are not unique, their 
benefits for scientific purposes are not assumed to be great.
The Protection or Improvement of Water Quality: Referring to the
previous discussion, the effect of water quality on production and con­
sumption activities can be viewed as a technological externality. There­
fore , the degree to which resource.reallocation occurs because of a water 
development is a justified increment of the efficiency account.. How­
ever, the effect in physical terms may provide a'better description of 
the quality impact because of our inability to measure in- value terms 
all the relevant considerations. Because of this , the physical effects 
should be displayed in the environmental quality account. The section on 
water quality benefits from the Crops study report provides the physical 
information that will be utilized in this analysis. Due to the elab­
orate nature of the determinations, this information will not be re­
calculated. However, when these procedures are applied to other projects, 
the input of a biological scientist (aquatic biologist or limnologist) 
would increase the reliability of such determinations.
Looking specifically at the effects of the proposed reservoir, the 
following water quality effects were considered: (l) Reduction m  hard­
ness; (2) Acid Reduction; (3) Reduced acid corrosion; (U) Water tem­
perature control; and (5) Increased assimilative capacity. Although 
such effects are interrelated, they will be considered separately for 
purposes of clarity. Provision of increased assimilation capacity is 
not discussed because of its relative unimportance as a project effect.
Hardness in water causes excessive scale formulation in industrial 
and municipal equipment. The industrial costs incurred arise from heat 
loss, scale removal operations, periodic draining of cooling systems, re­
duced production and water supply contamination.
116Corps of Engineers, West Fork River..■, Appendix V.
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The hardness concentration of the river system was determined to 
be 150 mg/l. The hardness concentration of the water released from the 
reservoir was forecast at 60 mg/l. Based on a flow of 100 cfs, the 
hardness concentration will be reduced by 5.3 mg/l for an average of 
151 days per year on the Monongahela River and 69 mg/l for an average 
of 2^1 days on the West Fork River. In the efficiency account, the 
savings in treatment costs (labor or chemicals) was used as the measure 
of benefits. Using this measure, the approximate 2010 annual benefit 
for hardness reduction would be $33,000 in the West Fork and $6000 in 
the Monongahela River.
The adverse effects of acid mine drainage from active mines can 
be alleviated by flow regulation. The report forecasts the average an­
nual total acidity concentration to be about 10 mg/l in the reservoir.
If the reservoir maintains a flow of 150 cfs, the average acidity con­
centration in the. Monongahela and West Fork Rivers would be decreased 
2 .7 mg/l over a period of l68 days and 7 mg/ 1 over a period of 277 days, 
respectively. Again, if benefits are measured as treatment cost reduc­
tion, the approximate 2010 annual benefit in the Monongahela River would 
be $10,800.
Furthermore,.the acid corrodes equipment of those industries uti­
lizing the river for transportation and navigation. The annual benefits 
to docks, dams, boats, and barges in the Monongahela River resulting 
from reduced corrosiveness are estimated to be $6,000 from a 100 cfs 
minimum continuous discharge. This is based on a Corps of Engineers 
report which estimated acid corrosion damage on the Monongahela River 
to be $877,000 annually.
Cooling water for steel production and thermal electric power gen­
eration results in increased river water temperatures. Flow regulation 
by the reservoir will reduce the effect of waste heat by maintaining 
greater flow volumes in the Monongahela River. Based on the analysis 
of a thermal-electric power plant on the Monongahela River, the annual 
benefits from stream flow regulation for cooling water were estimated 
to be $1 1,000.
The Prevention of Erosion and the Restoration of Eroded Areas: Since
there are no mines in the immediate area of the reservoir, only the ef­
fects on watershed and critical erosion areas will be discussed. The 
steep hillsides of the West Fork river valley, which are critical ero­
sion areas, are not farmed. Therefore^ .erosion effects would ap­
pear to be minor. However, watershed activities are occuring on two 
tributaries of the West Fork (Tenmile Creek and Polk Creek). The ef­
fect of the Stonewall Jackson Reservoir on the benefits and costs for 
these projects is unknown. However, the SCS projects include flood con­
trol components with benefits accruing to the West Fork basin. There­
fore, a undetermined amount of flood control benefits could be double 
counted. The presence of this possible double counting should be speci­
fied in the evaluation.
Summary: Table 18 presents the environmental quality display for the
Stonewall Jackson Reservoir Project.
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TABLE 18
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY DISPLAY - STONEWALL JACKSON RESERVOIR
A. 1. Primitive camping on the small 
islands produced hy the dam.
2. Possible establishment of a - 
medipm quality reservoir fishery,
3- The improvement in the scenery 
for recreation related commercial 
enterprises,
B. 1. The Reservoir and the 'wildlife 
mitigation area could serve as a 
natural ecological laboratory. How­
ever, these areas are not scienti­
fically unique.
C. 1. Reduction in hardness concen­
tration of 5*3 mg/1 for an average 
of 151 days annually on the Monon- 
gahela River and 69 mg/l for an 
average of 2hl days on the West Fork 
River 'when the reservoir release is 
greater than 100 cfs.
2. Decrease in acid concentration 
by 2.7 mg/1 for a period, of 168 days 
in the Monongahela River and 7 mg/l- 
over a period of 277 days in the 
West Fork River when the reservoir 
flow is 150 cfs.
3. The acid reduction will prevent 
corrosion to locks, barges, boats, 
and dams by the amount equivalent 
to $6,000 annually when the flow is 
100 cfs.
1. Inundation of the picturesque 
wooded and”grassland hillsides which 
are not unique in the region.
2. Inundation of a low quality 
stream fishery - 35*1 miles-
B. 1. Inundation of old farms with 
possible historic value.
C. 1. Inundation of natural gas pipes 
which leaves the reservoir liable 
to underwater leaks.
2. There is no increase in organic 
assimilation capacity because of 
the reservoir.
3. There is.double counting of some 
flood control and water supply bene­
fits on the West Fork River because 
of the duplicating effects of the 
reservoir and two small watershed 
projects.
Beneficial Consequences Detrimental Consequences
A.
k . Water temperature on the Monon­
gahela River will be controlled by 
flow regulation such that annual 
benefit is equal to $11,000.
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If quality factors in consumption could be considered quantitatively, 
environmental quality would be included in the efficiency■and equity ac­
counts. Since empirical problems make this impossible, however, a dis­
play of the quality effects in physical terms provides supplementary in­
formation to the political decision-maker. With the display, accessibi­
lity to the decision maker is Improved. The naturalist, the historian, 
the limnologist, and the research scientist are provided new access with 
respect to water development evaluation and decision-making.
ALTERNATIVE PLAN FORMULATION
With the introduction of Planning-Programming-Budgeting into the 
Federal Government in 1965, departments and agencies were required to 
perform substantial policy analyses when expanding an old program or re­
questing a new one. Apart from measuring effectiveness and estimating 
costs, comparison of alternative approaches to achieve given program 
objectives was required. Program objectives were often stated as a 
goal (to protect a flood plain, or to educate 1000 hard core unemployed) 
and either the least cost or most economically efficient method of 
achieving the goal Indicated the direction in which one might move.
The Water Resources Council Task Force Report on Evaluation Pro­
cedures has added a new dimension and much clarification to the process 
by which alternative means to a goal may be evaluated. By defining a 
type of social welfare function with four component parts, it has made 
explicit other welfare criteria, besides national economic efficiency, 
by which various courses of action must be measured.^ Thus, the most 
efficient alternative means of achieving flood control can no longer be 
immediately deemed superior to all others.
Yet presently there appears to be no satisfactory "rule" by which 
alternatives can be limited and choices made between them. While the 
admission of a social welfare function with four component parts Is use­
ful, these parts are still not adequately defined, nor have tradeoffs 
between each component part been made explicit. This section will not
117Keith E.. Marvin and Andrew M. Rouse, "The .Status of PPB in Fed­
eral Agencies: A Comparative Perspective" and Jack W. Carlson, "The
Status and Next Steps For Planning, Programming and Budgeting," in The 
Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditure: The PPB System, Sub­
committee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee 
(Congress ^f the United States, 1969)-
118
This form of the social welfare function has been highlighted 
by Marglin. See: Stephen A. Marglin, 'Objectives of Water Resource
Development: A General Statement", in A. Maass et. al, Design of Water
Resource Systems, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962)
pp. 17-17. '
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attempt to develop this clear set of rules. The question will he not so 
much one of choosing the "best alternative, hut rather one of ashing how 
enough alternatives can he presented so that the ’'wisest course of action 
may he chosen.
Some Basic Definitions: Before proceeding, some definitions need to he
presented. It should"he emphasized that the conclusions drawn in this 
section hinge on these definitions. Discontent with the conclusions 
may very well stem from disagreement with the definitions.
Weeds: As defined here, needs relate to a water function (flood
control, recreation, wild river, etc.) and not to thp four objective 
accounts - efficiency, regional income, environmental quality, and well­
being. These needs are usually of a collective nature, that is the pri­
vate market is either unwilling or unable to provide for them and the 
burden for their provision falls on government.
Alternatives: As discussed here, alternatives will mean alternative
vays of providing for needs. It does not imply alternative ways of pro­
moting, for example, regional growth.
Objectives: The four objective accounts defined by the Task Force
are viewed as "a means by which to measure the social welfare impact of 
the alternative ways by which needs can be provided..
The crux of the problem, then, is to accurately identify needs.
There is no standard list. They are identified by our regional and na­
tional institutions.'^ '9 However, the potential disagreement with these 
definitions is recognized. Maass and Major, for example, argue that in 
the past water resource investment decisions have been made with respect 
to objectives such as, but not limited to, national efficiency, and that 
this will continue to be the case in the future. ^  The argument that 
ultimate decisions on water resource investment have been made with ren 
spect to a multi-dimensional welfare function is agreed upon here. Yet 
the question still arises as to whether these project investments were 
made because of these objectives, or were measured by these^objectives. 
While this may appear to be a semantic distinction, it has implications 
for alternative plan formulation and the entire decision process. If 
social welfare objectives are to be considered as goals by each agency, *120
"'""'"^ Distortions in the institutional mechanisms, such as inordinate 
amounts of power in the hands of one group, may in fact lead to dis­
tortions in the definition of needs. For example, a small but power­
ful industry which requires water of a certain acid content may force 
pollution control measures whose costs exceed benefits to the society 
at large. While this problem will be alluded to again, it will not be 
discussed in much detail.
120A. Maass and D. C. Major,' "Economics in Regional Water Research 
and Policy: A Comment," American Journal of Agricultural Economic_s_
(Feb. 1970).
then the Bureau of Reclamation, for example, must consider not only al­
ternative irrigation projects for regional growth, but also highways, 
education etc. Few would argue that this is a job for this agency.
This agency should consider only the more proximate goal of providing 
for water requirements.
This distinction between needs and objectives is not made by the 
Task Force and, thus, the exact purposes of the report are unclear..
The document states:
In formulation of a comprehensive river basin plan and the pro­
gram elements of the plan, two fundamental series of decisions 
are involved: (l) the choices among objectives and (2) the
choices of alternative means to achieve these objectives. All 
appropriate objectives are to be considered in the planning 
process and one national objective should not necessarily be 
considered more significant than another objective. However, 
one objective may emerge with more weight than another In 
achieving'the plan. The specific- elements of the objectives to 
be considered should be stated at the start of the study and the 
plan formulated to achieve them. It is recognized that as plan­
ning proceeds there may.be modification in objectives. Inter­
relations and combinations among and between means and objectives 
will be Involved. The analysis and accounts described) provide 
the basis for reasoned judgment about.composition of the com­
prehensive plan, including the mix of.objectives and the pro­
gram elements to achieve them (underlining added) . 121
As Castle has stated, it is difficult to visualize exactly how the system 
of accounts would work in practice. 15122 This difficulty stems -directly 
from the fact that the Task Force has neglected to define the area of 
concern for water resource agencies properly. They are concerned pri­
marily with water needs not with overall national welfare objectives.
This viewpoint Is admittedly a "conservative” view of agency purposes. 
However, It seems unlikely that water resource agencies were created to 
promote national income, or regional growth. More likely they were 
created to provide for water needs when higher level decision making 
authority felt that water was a constraining factor In achieving these 
ends. Furthermore, the agency, as a political group, is not for example 
pushing efficiency, but rather a water function like flood control. Its 
political constituency would be pro-flood control, not for any given wel­
fare objective.
The plea here is for a higher level decision making authority to 
be the one concerned with highlighting the relevant social welfare ob-
Water Resources Council, Procedures for Evaluation.... 5^-55.
122Emery N. Castle, Testimony Presented to the Water Resources 
Council Hearing in Portland Oregon, August 1 1, 1969.
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jectives, and not the planning and . ^ F o / e ^ p l e ,
l e v e l  d e c is io n  a u t h o r i t y  may he  comp . mav -De K r>  l y
the choice between highways or water for regional g r o w t h may he ma,le y 
th e  p re s e n t  s ys tem  o f  re v ie w  conduc ted  b y  th e  B u re au  o f  th e  B udge t and
Congress.
e n t i r e  "  i- Up "  W a fe r R esou rces  C o u n c il t o  m easure
~ i 5  s «
regulate competition between the diverse agencies engaged in
source management. These ideas will he discussed m  more detail later.
In summary, the Task Force report 18 Pr^ ® d^ S,,p° d ' ■
ation of Water and Related Land Resource Projects , and notf ™ c e d u
for Evaluating Alternative Investments vhich to
It is the purposes of these projects - their tuncbio the
he e v a lu a te d  in  te rm s  o f  th e  s o c ia l  w e lf a r e  f u n c t io n  “ i £ “ e^ d£ e 
Task  Fo rce  r e p o r t .  To a rgue  t h a t  th e  money ”  p o in t
?f“ A Ss-c^
and less suceptible to quantitative analysis.
s a s s s s s s ^ s # F = "Some possible approaches which appear logical will he considered
The Task Force’s instructions for testing the proposed procedures 
f e a s ib le  a t  le a s t  one a l t e r n a t i v e  p la n  s h o u ld  he fo r-  suggest that if feas , . ^ 3  rnnsider the following situation
m u la te d  e m p h a s iz in g  each o b je c t iv e .  t  a p la n  to  m ax im ize  each
aq an example of what may happen if one presents a pi
o b je c t iv e T s c c o u n t , how eve r. The f o l lo w in g  “ e ^
w h ic h  a re  m ost c r i t i c a l  to  t h e . c o n c lu s io n s  drawn w i l l  he r e l a x
a time and their effects noted.
2'. p t a ^ T a n f l ^ r e  presented, by a single agency or group,
which will satisfy these needs.
3. Each plan maximizes one account. measure ^  welfare
k . Two objective accounts, A and B, are useu 
effects of the two plans.
5 All aspects of accounts A and B can he quantified.
6 . There is a 50-50 tradeoff between objective accounts.
m jn.+inn of Table 19 reveals that plan I maximizes account B and plan II 
S £ b a A u n t a !  T o t a l  n e t b e n e f i t s  f o r  p la n  I I  exceed th o s e  f o r  p la n  I
and, therefore, plan II must he chosen.
12^Water Resources Council, "Instructions for Testing, 7*
7^
TABLE 19
MULTI OBJECTIVE ALTERNATIVE PLAN EVALUATION AND DISPLAY
Objective
Account
Plan I — ----------- ----------- —Plan IT
Benefits Costs Net' Benefits Costs Net
A 100 50 +50 70 10 +60
B 60 50 +10 95 90 +5
Total Net 
Benefits +6o +6 5.
However, examination of Table 20 sho¥q that n'f- Q T-r-r .
which maximizes neither account it mav G f Plan 111 1S consideredtt m-u A  . ■ acGOUnu, it may be superior to either nlanq T nr
. herefore, maximizing each account and making a choice from these
TABLE 20
BENEFIT AND COST DISPLAY OF PLAN III
Obj ective 
Account Plan III
---- --------
Benefits Costs Net
A 79 20 +59
B 89 80 +9
Total Net 
Benefits
+68
IhurnatvIdAlgn0reS W XiStence of Posslble second test solutions 
f i n a l  d e c is io n  m ak ing  a l t e m a t lT e s  ^  <*en up to  th e  p o in i  o f
Now, however, some of the assumptions which underlie thi'q -model are rei svori t-p „„ , . ^  UIluerj-ie unis decision
no w e ig h ts  a r e ^ "  ab?T e - and
m odel becomes u n w o rk a b le  I f  one i s  u L w !  to  > V ? n V  th e  d e c is io n
£ £  ^  ^  a n ^ l t e r n a t i v eunder all categories is m  fact the most desirable. Even more to the
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point, there is no way hy which an£ alternative can be ^
total social welfare effect. These weights are viewed here as outputs total social wen decision to decisionof the political process and, as such, vary iron aeci^iu
and time to time in an unpredictable fashion.
It has been suggested elsewhere, however, that some set of-weights
based upon " c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  in t e n t ,  g u id e l in e s  e s ta b l is h e d
-in Taw and precedent and ultimately subjective evaluations by politically
z i z z t  £s.i» s
?n  re p la c e m e n t o f  th e  l i g h t s  assumed w i t h  some o th e rs  r a t h e r  th a n  aban-
donment of weights altogether.
If one is willing to say that weights are a higher level decision, 
n o t r e la t e d  to  c o n c re te  d e c is io n s  made each d a y , th e n  w e ig h ts  can be a - 
s fg n e d  a p r i o r i .125 H ow ever, t h i s  ty p e  o f  a ss ig nm en t f o r  w e lf a r e  w e ig h ts  
rith respect to the environment in which the ultimate results of pro- 
irals and projects will have impact) may not lead to a maximisation of 
s o c ia l  w e lf a r e .  F o r e xam p le , r e g io n a l  g ro w th  may be ra n k e d  h ig h e r  th a n
environmental quality as a national I f  ^ b y V a t i r
self bursting with industrialisation and population and plagu ^r 
pollution, the national ordering of priorities makes little sense w 
evaluating alternative means of pollution control for that region.
One p h ra s e  i n  F reem an 's  p ro c e d u re s  f o r  a s s ig n in g  w e ig h ts  s t a n d o u t  - 
" s u b je c t iv e  e v a lu a t io n s  b y  p o l i t i c a l l y  re s p o n s iv e  d e c is io n  m ake rs .
Politically responsive to whom? It would,seem “
be to  th o s e  who have  a s ta k e  i n  t h e . d e c is io n  as w e l l , a s  to ,som e  n a t io n a l  
social welfare function. The point being that defining weights for a 
s o c ia l  w e lf a r e  f u n c t io n  w i t h  no re fe re n c e  to  a c o n c re te  re g io n  o r  p la n
may just as easily serve to decrease welfare as to increase i
I t  has been shown t h a t  r e la x in g  th e  a ssum p tio n  t h a t  w e lf a re  w e ig h ts  
a re  known d e s tro y s  th e  p ro c e d u re  f o r  l im i t i n g  and c ho o s ing  among a l. . e r  
n a t iv e s  H ow eve r, s in c e  some have  a rg ued  t h a t  w e ig h ts  can b e .d e  l m  , 
can It th e n  be a rg ued  (b y  a c c e p t in g  t h i s  a s su m p tio n ) t h a t  a d e c is io n  p ro ­
cedure like that outlined above becomes possible?
1 2 k & Mvrick Freeman III, "Project Design and Evaluation with Mul- 
i,-r i „  n M .n t . lT B B . "  The A n a ly s is  and E v a lu a t io n  o f  P u b l ic  E x p e n d itu re s ^  
T h e P E B  S vs tem , V o l.  2 , Subcom m ittee  on Economy i n  Governm ent o f  th e  
^ o in t^ E c o n o m lc' C o m m itte e , (C ong ress  o f  th e  U n ite d  S ta t e s ,  1969) P- 5 5
A similar suggestion has been made by Musgrave. See. R. A.^Musgrave,
"Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Theory of Public F m  , --------—
Ppnmomic Literature, Vol. VII, (September, 1969) P- 803. *12
125Musgrave suggests this approach. Weights on each objective 
would be determined by tbe Bureau of the Budget or a similar agency 
and then used on all government programs. Ibid.
12^Freeman, 565.
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Relaxing assumption number five, that all aspects of all objective
accoun ts  can be q u a n t i f ie d ,  has th e  same e f f e c t  on th e  s ys tem  as as-
sming^non-quantifiabie weights. The choice of a best plan becomes in-
a g lv e n nn r o ie c t  Pr0l:aeinS and “ a b i l i t y  to  q u a n t i f y  many a sp ec ts  o f  
?• 1  T - P r ° s ram  a re  h ig h l ig h t e d  e ls e w h e re  in  t h i s  r e p o r t
made on toe effecfan’ jUdgements (altelt e*Pert ones) must be• ,, . fect any Plan may have on any one objective account a a
with weights, these value judgements are subject to challenge depindinv
on how th e  v a lu a t io n  o f  p e rc e iv e d  b e n e f i t s  d i f f e r s  be tw een  in d i v i d u a ls 8groups j or agencies. ^Qiuauais,
This idea of different perceptions leads to a consideration of 
sum p tio n  num ber t h r e e ,  t h a t  a f i n i t e  num ber o f  a ; t e r n a t iv e s  can be deter­
m ined and a c c u r a te ly  a n a ly z e d  by one agency o r  g rown w-i+u +■
the varied models of decision mLing, Irt [t ie Sa fTi® ^
prehensive piannmg by one group is not possible.1^? It is as sumedTiere 
that decision makers and decision points are many and diverse and that
we often ^  I  T f ' ’ T ®11 if they are aware °f a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  th e y  
a re  o f te n  n o t empowered l e g a l l y  to  im p lem en t them . F o r exam p le  th e  7
Army Corps of Engineers can not consider treatment plants as 
n a t i v e  means o f  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l ,  n o r  a re  th e v  l i k e l y  to  c o rs T d e r f f  ,  
plain zoning as an alternative for flood control Boi 1  f  5
areas of jurisdiction. Therefore many rd ins Tfi s ‘ oeyond tnelr
may escape d e te c t io n  u n le s s  t h e r e ’ i s  some w a y ’to  ° “ ‘  ■
t e r n a t iv e s  into the decision process. possible al-
The relaxation, of assumptions has destroved the m • .
f ram ew o rk  s e t  up e a r l i e r  f o r  e m p i r ic a l  a n a ly s is  Y e t th e  1 =  de01SF n 
o f  t h i s  f ra m e w o rk  i s  a c o n c e p tu a l id e a l .  I ? ,  t h e r e f o r e ! b e c ^ s ^ e 'c ^ s - 011 
y o propose some sort of procedures which will approach this ideal 
While the ^ evaluation procedures in the Task Force report are couched ' 
i n  econom ic te rm s  ( i . e .  b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s ) ,  th e  f o rm u la t io n  o f  a l t e r  
n a t iv e  p la n s  m ust go beyond th e  p u r e ly  econom ic lu s t  e l f l i  it
by academic disciplines.118 * ® p Process not
127
s r s -
128^
For further discussion of this point see the =--+•? ™  ™  • 4-•
■ S ”  or v a i L r ^ r i n t a n g m L ^ o r l f  s t S  ^  '“ T *  t0terms of come set of ^
cost of acquiring this type of information would be high and evln if
one were to build up a backlog of information, there some iuIsTion
S i m  W° U ld  t e  m ak ing  d e c is io n s ?  ^ C e r t a i n l y 11piticaily sensitive and responsive groups of decision makers should be
e to anticipate what values or weights would make sense with respect
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The Role of Group Pluralism in Defining Alternatives,: Weeds are arti
culated bTgroups in the political process. These needs are then pre­
sented to other groups (here government agencies) , empowered to satis y 
the needs. In the satisfaction of these needs, new groups^one forth 
whenever conflict arises over the satisfaction of the original nee s 
and their vested interests. Through a process of partisan mutual adjus 
ment (a la Lindbloom), a compromise is struck which^all groups can be 
at least partially satisfied with. So runs the basic model of the group 
process in water resource management at the governmental level, m  
fact, this basic model, in the past, has often failed because there w a s ^  
no point in the system where some groups could find access very easily*
As a result, single agencies have often taken it upon themselves to 
define needs, propose alternatives, choose among them, and implemen  ^
the plan chosen. They have internalised the whole process. In so^doing 
they have limited the system's usefulness for defining the public m  
terest, since agencies themselves can be considered interest groups and 
the alternatives presented are limited to those acceptable to IS' group.
The WRC document offers three new points of access. By effectively 
using these three additional- access points, both government agencies and 
private interest groups which previously were excluded from plan^formula 
tion, except at the point of reacting to proposed plans,^can be incorpo 
rated more effectively into the planning process. In this way, they 
bring new ideas and new expertise to the problems of planning for water 
needs. In short, they bring alternatives. It should be clear y 
that the question of alternative plan formulation is viewed as being in_  
mately~related to the power of groups with different points of 
get these views into the planning process. Any proposals for a system 
by which alternatives can be formulatecTwill be based upon a heal y 
group system.
The Relevancy of the Ot.iective Accounts' One other problem, which_ re­
lates to the questionof alternative plans formulation, will now be ad- 
dressed. The Task Force asked the test teams to "address the relevancy
to the objectives of the interests involved in any given situation, with 
out reference to valuation of intangibles or preference unc ion 
politically sensitive decision maker, then, would have little use for 
quantitative formulations and descriptions of the group political pro 
cess which he already has a feel for.
129There are other reasons why this process may he inadequate.^ Some 
maintain that this model of group pluralism can not qead to 
social welfare even if access is improved. They maintain that the pr 
itself is devoid of objectives and procedures which are universally ac­
cepted and so leads to non-optimum definitions of the public interest 
See- Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (Hew York: W. W. Norton and
Co Inc. 1969). In fact, the political process is presently working 
through groups and, In this report, a radical change in the group pro 
cess is not suggested. Along these lines, however, improvement m  ac­
cess to agencies for groups and other agencies seems to be a change 
"the margin which could he quite useful.
of the several national objectives for the area under study and deter- 
mne Thich ones should he considered for plan formulation and which ones 
could he rejected and the reasons for reject '.on. "130 ■ porce
provides the analyst with four objective accounts by which to measure 
social welfare: National economic efficiency, a regional account,
environmental quality and well-being. Without trying to identify all 
the fme points of each account, it will be useful to address the question 
of how the national efficiency account relates to the others.
It has been suggested elsewhere that 
much an ultimate goal of society as it is economic efficiency is not a means to an end.^31
so
conomic growth appears. . . in a supporting role to higher 
objectives of man. It is not likely however that such ulti­
mate goals can be achieved when the production of economic 
wealth in a society is at a low level. As the production of 
economic^wealth increases, the extent to which improved effi­
ciency , if measured by an increase in national income, can be 
used to achieve these more ultimate goals may decline.132
There is little question that the 
levels where the role of economic 
in a social welfare function.
United States has achieved growth 
efficiency as a goal has less weight
As national income improves the importance of extra-market 
goods, which are not normally included m  improved national 
income, increases. It is not that economic efficiency loses 
importance; it is simply that the traditional ways of measuring 
it do not bring into the open the items of greatest relevance.-*-33
These extra market goods can probably be classified as improved regional 
and personal income distribution, improved environmental quality im­
proved population distribution, etc. All these fit under objective ac­
counts other than national efficiency in the Task Force Report. If 
indeed tnese extra- market goods do now command a higher position in our 
socie y than increased national income, the accounts which incorporate extr; 
market goods will receive greater weight when analyzing alternative- 
means of supplying water needs.
130.i
Water Resources Council, "Instructions for Testing," 7 .
131
Emery N.Castie and Russell Youmans, "Economics in Regional Water 
(Decari968)d P°llC y5 American Journal of Agricultural Economics. Vol, 50
132
1 6 6 2. G a i lb r a i t h  sug g es ted  t h i s  same s o r t  o f  app roach  
He sug g es ts  t h a t  more goods and s e rv ic e s  may n o t be as d e s ir a b le  a
goal as better use and distribution of the goods and services we al­
ready have. See: John K. Galbraith, The Affluent Societv
H oughton M i f f l i n  C o . ,  1 9 5 8 ) . ---- ---------------- s r a n '
133Castle and Youmans, 1663.
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Still one must return to the point made earlier, that economic^ef 
ficiency remains important as a measurement of the means by which give 
ends are Achieved. Since planning for water needs is the primary purpose 
to which we must address ourselves, it is better to satisfy these needs 
more efficiently than inefficiently provided that the desired criteria 
qpt forth in other components of the social welfare,function have been 
satisfactorily metl Varying amounts of national income gam may have 
to be sacrr^ceT T o  achieve other aspects of the social welfare function,
and this is recognized.
The determination of the weights necessary to make the tradeoffs 
among the various criteria making up a social welfar*
beyond the realm of economics. The task once more must fall on our in 
tutions and political system. While the economist has a clear role i 
this system, he alone can not define a social welfare function - the
"public interest.”
and G e n e ra l M ode l o f  P ro cedu re s  fo r. F o rm u la t in g  and E v a lu ^  
Sting A l t e r n a t i v e s :  W h ile  t h i s s e c t io n  is  t i t l e d  " A l t e r n a t i v e  r ia n _
Formulation", in Tact it has not developed procedures for doing th , 
and only a few brief suggestions will be made toward this end. 
reason for this is two fold. First, it seemed a more useful endeavor 
to draw the distinction between water needs and social welfare mjec ives, 
and thin to clarify the position of_the objectives within e; social wel­
fare function. Secondly, and most important y, 1 seeme welfare
demonstrate that the introduction of a multi-dimensional social welfare 
S o l  has effectively limited the role which quantitative economic 
a.nalvsis can have in defining and,choosing among alternatives, in 
view of this, the word "procedure" takes on new meaning.
must mean parameters of action for the group process as well as the proper 
d e f i n i t i o n a l ! b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s .  Some o f  th e s e ^ d e a s  w i l l  now 1ae lo o s e ly
tied together to indicate the direction the new procedures for formu 
lation and evaluation of alternatives should take.
A Criteria for Limiting Alternatives: It has been argued previously
that the purpose of water resource development is to provide for wa er 
needs. It was also assumed that a priori weights for a social welfare 
function cannot be quantitatively determined at this stage in history to 
Islislin the choicl among alternatives. Because of this situation other, 
more proximate, decision models must be used. It will be proposed that 
alternative projects which provide for water needs should be considered 
(initially) only if their benefit-cost ratio exceeds unity, and each 
alternative is analysed with respect to the other objective accounts 
to gain information on each component of the welfare function. Imp 
cit in this statement is the assumption that if no efficient means o 
satisfying the water needs can he found then it may be wise to question 
the existence of these needs. It, of course, must he, noted that one 
can envision a situation where the efficient means of supplying needs 
has an undesirable effect on the other objective accounts If the needs 
are reexamined and one still wishes to provide for them, then an mef 
ficient means may be utilized. Thus, one would be willing to sacrifice 
national income for the other objectives.
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The m a m  point of this section, then, is that using a benefit-cost 
ratio greater than one as a cut-off criterion for alternatives is ac- 
ceptabie. At any point m  the decision process a plan may be rejected 
due to, say, adverse environmental effects, and at this point it may 
be necessary to offer a plan which is inefficient, Thus, the presenta­
tion of^ alternatives may be a process with more than one round. To 
unit first round^ alternatives to those having a benefit-cost ratio 
greater than one is as good a criterion as is available given our lack 
of knowledge. We are in effect muddling through.
Another advantage of using the benefit-cost ratio as a cut-off 
criterion relates to the role of efficiency as a measure of means and 
not an end. By formulating the most efficient plan, and then all others 
the cost of choosing other than this most efficient plan can be approxi-’ 
mated^by noting the reduction in net national efficiency benefits from 
choosing a less efficient plan. This opportunity cost concept can be 
used to give an accurate measure of the costs of choosing one plan over 
another. These will be costs in the traditional economic s e n s e .^
There would also be costs to other objective accounts. Choosing a plan 
which^has beneficial effects on environmental quality may mean forgoing 
some income redistribution benefits. These costs are also recognised
u- are not subject to quantification as are national income gains or' losses.
An exact procedure for formulating and evaluating alternatives can ' 
?°4. inSd llere' The nature of the group process which will formu­
late alternatives must itself be determined by the group process. One 
can envision, however, two polar types of alternative plan formulation 
under the auspices of a strengthened Water Resources Council. One 
type of planning forces inter-agency competition, while the other puts 
a premium on extensive cooperation and coordination. As may be guessed. 
tm e ideal group process must lie somewhere between these two extremes.
_ competitive model would work as follows. Given the definition
of needs, the Water Resources Council would examine their nature and 
choose the appropriate agency or agencies to study the problem and pro­
pose a plan^for their satisfaction. In all cases the proposed plan
^ lonal froni agency’s frame of reference. For example, 
the benefits must exceed the costs of any flood control proposal. It 
is recognized that for achievement of aesthetic goals (like a wild river) 
he best plan must be.one based on expert judgement not a benefit- 
cost calculation.
See: Castle
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These views are developed fully by Castle elsewhere 
Testimony, 4-7 .
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The whole problem of need definition which' was alluded to earlier 
is glossed over here. How the preferences of individuals or groups 
can be^accurately reflected in the political process is a problem of 
major importance and is vital to the proper working of any system of 
resource planning.
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Upon completion, the plants) would he submitted to agencies pre­
viously alerted by the WRC. They would do studies on the three objec­
tive accounts which were not of concern to the original planning agency. 
For example, upon completion of a Corps plan for a^flood control dam, 
the Fish and Wildlife Service and the relevant regional development com 
mission would.evaluate the impact of the project on the environmental, 
regional growth, and well-being accounts.
It is not the intention here to convey the impression that all agen­
cies (especially those concerned with national income) must by definition 
be indifferent to all objective accounts other than their own.^ For 
example, the Corps can have a biologist to advise them, but this does 
not mean that they do the environmental analysis.
The results of the analysis of all the objective accounts are, 
then put into a display and the Water Resources Council decides whether 
the'specific plan has undesirable effects on social welfare. If it does 
not it is recommended to "higher authorities” where the decision on 
funding water projects vis-a-vis all other spending programs is made.
If it is not a suitable plan, the agency who originated it is ashed to 
propose the next most rational plan from their viewpoint (next highest 
B/C ratio) and the whole process repeats itself until some plan is -ound 
which in some sense maximizes social welfare. As one moves from say n e 
most' efficient plan to some other in order to meet other^welfare goals, 
the opportunity cost of national Income forgone by choosing the alter­
native plan can be highlighted.
■ Basically, then, agencies compete with one another to have their 
idea of what makes up social welfare accepted by the WRC. Acceptance 
of certain projects and project modifications by^the WRC reflects a 
successful effort by the agency or agencies backing the project and.is 
modifications to persuade the WRC of their view of what the social wel­
fare Impact of the project would be.
At the other extreme is complete agency coordination. In this case 
the WRC would choose an agency to represent each social welfare objec­
tive as well as the agency which is to propose a plan to meet-the water 
related need. They would all cooperate to propose alternative plans to 
meet this need. Thus, the expertise to highlight social welfare objec 
fives would be present when the initial plans were formulated. ^The 
resulting plan would be the product of consensus and not competition e
tween agencies.
Both the models above have flaws. The competitive extreme would 
produce a vastly complicated and costly planning process, although like 
the perfectly competitive market ideal it would no doubt lead to goo 
results. The model of coordination would reduce the complications and 
cost of planning significantly but perhaps at the expense^of social wel 
fare. To argue that agencies represent social welfare objectives is 
probably an oversimplification of reality. Agencies m  fact represent 
clientele groups who demand certain goods and services^which m  turn 
reflect social welfare objectives. While the competitive model would 
tend to -keep agencies responsive to clientele groups, the model of com-
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plete coordination creates the danger that the cooperating agencies may 
become more responsive to each other than to the groups and social wel- 
iare objectives that they must represent.
The conclusion which arises from the above discussion is only that 
1S somf optimum mix between agency coordination and competition 
in the planning process. The proportions of each must be determined 
y trial and error and the success of planning measured by how well 
the public interest is served.
. Essentially what has been discussed up to now is organization chart 
manipulation. While this.is necessary to indicate how things ought to 
work the existence of such procedures does not guarantee that is what 
t ^ ^ ^ aPPen* ■ A crucaal issue in the planning, process is who has power.
or ^here is a definite relationship of power to organizational structure 
Varying levels of power do allow one to disrupt the organizational struc­
ture to varying degrees. For example, the financial and institutional 
posi ion of the Army Corps of Engineers allows them to circumvent existing
, authoritY more easily than the National Park Service or Fish
and Wildlife Service would be able to.
Related to the question of power is that of access to the planning 
Process. Implementation of the Task Force Report would certainly pro­
vide this access to many groups which may have previously been excluded. 
This is a step which can lead to a balancing of the power relationships 
which now exist in water resource management. Another useful step would 
be to channel all funds for water resource development through the WRC 
and permit the agencies to compete for these funds and for new roles.136 
This would force more equitable power relationships between the different 
agencies and therefore, between the clientele groups and social welfare 
objectives they represent.
In short the proposal and evaluation of alternative plans to meet 
water needs must be a mix of agency coordination and competition in an 
atmosphere of equitable power relationships. Some further general 
points flow from this analysis:
1 . The.process by which projects and plans for water resource de­
velopment are approved will not be changed. Federal programs will go 
from the WRC through the Bureau of the Budget, and localized interests 
may resort to congressional activities to get their viewpoints heard, 
once the planning stage is over.
2.. Accounts are not definable by.agency lines. Therefore the 
agency m  charge of each account may vary from project to proiect This 
may cause problems. If one agency is utilized a great deal more than
t This idea of interagency competition 
Allee , Coordination of Agency Activities , 11 A 
Symposium of the Statewide meeting of the U. 
vice, Syracuse, N. Y, June 2 1, 1967.
is discussed in: David J.
paper presented to the 
S. Soil Conservation Ser-
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others, it may develop disproportionate powers. It may in fact be neces­
sary to set up boards concerned with each account which then in turn can 
farm out work to subordinate agencies. These boards could be of equal 
stature and power.
3. The purpose of the new procedures is to prove to agencies such 
as the National Park Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, or regional 
development boards, that they must take on a more active role m  plan 
formulation. In the past, they were put In a position of always reacting 
to proposals with high benefit-cost ratios. Now their line of expertise 
and.Interest is being highlighted and they have become full partners 
in the system of plan formulation.
The WRC must be staffed with a significant number of people 
who have no vested interest in one agency's program over anothers.
These people should also have no interest in federal programs over state 
or local programs. This may be asking for a great deal but it is a 
goal worth striving for. It should be expected that personnel m  the 
WRC would have lobbying pressure placed on them and^not on the planning 
agencies. This is, in fact, how they must make their decisions - m  
response to the group process.
5. These procedures as outlined above admittedly ignore one of 
the crucial problems in water and land resource management, that of 
coordinating local, state and federal programs and plans. Thxs problem 
is of major proportions, and it is not clear how the Task Force report
attempts to remedy it.
No rules have been■introduced for planning alternatives because 
the Task Force Report should not provide such rules. It is a political, 
as well as economic document, which has made an attempt to provide some 
method of determining the public interest. The following statement by- 
Steiner relates these two uses of the Task Force Report and serves qui e 
well in summarizing the thrust of this section.
Obviously the question "What is the public interest? has no 
simple answer. Indeed asking the question invites the sort of 
smile reserved for small children and benign idiots. . . ..There
is a role for measurement, a role for analysis, and some need 
for explicit decision making . . . One of the economists1 most
potent functions is to honestly identify what can be accurately 
measured and compared and what (on the other hand) involves such 
heroics of assumption that actual measurements are but concealed 
preferences. The advantage of articulating real choices over 
assigning measures that appear to obviate them is to make the 
decision explicit and subject to review. But having identified 
the scope for explicit choice does not mean public administrators 
have unconstrained choice. Within particular dimensions depar^ 
tures from the efficient solution ought to be identified and
justified. (emphasis added) _ _
Clearly all sorts of decisions do get made and not all of 
them are sensible . . . (but) . . .  I should be willing to re
8H
gard open decisions arrived at fey elected (or otherwise responsifele) 
public officials as a reasonafele approximation of the collective 
values we call the' public interest.
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™ a Pe^er °* Steiner, "The Public Sector and the Public Interest' 
-— e Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System 
Vol. 1^ , Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic’ 
Committee (Congress of the United States, 1969).
An
nu
al
 C
os
ts
Mu
lt
i-
Pu
rp
os
e 
Pr
oj
ec
t 
(l
 o
mi
tt
ed
)
85
po
p
p  P
CD -P
PO4)
I—IO
P-p ft 
P O O ft O ft ■H
ftft^ ftCO
P
0
■s
p•H
ft ft
&  p
p a 0) o
Id
m
PMoo
O 1—!
P P
ft P  O ft
0 0 O 0 0  0 0
0 0 O 0 0  0  f 0
0 0 O 0 VO C— i on
r» r, n C" n  n 1
p - VO O 00 OV VO 1
CM t— O CM CM l a rH
ft CM P “ VO i>—fl-i
f t CM CO rH H
00 CO
ooo
L T \
ft
00
to00
ppoap00>9
ooo
VO
COft-
CM
ooo
ft
L A
LPs
CO
9o■H
w p  
CD O 
P 9  
9 P  
P  P  ■H W ft 9 
9 O 0) o&H 9*[—l
P P  O 9 ■H ft 
P
O P  9 0] 
P 0) 
p  p  m o 
P P  
o  P O H
ft
ft
ftm
ft
ftfth
3ftoft-
0 0 O 0 O O O O
0 0 O 0 O O O O
0 0 O 0 CP f t  0 VO
4' r  ^ f\ n
lr\ CO CO OV VO VD OV
ft VO ft ft CM f t  ft VO
CM 0 co ft ft VOn n <-■
CO CM O 1—1 ft
CM CO
O O 0 0 O O O 0
O O 0 0 O O O 0
O O 0 0 CO f t  0 LAr\ r, 4-. r. r ^
VO O VO CM ft VQ f t f t
CO la CO IP CO f t  ft f t
ft- ft CO ft- ft ON
tf-L. r-
00 CM LT\ ft - ft
CO CO
o 0 0 0  o 0 0 0O VO ft- o
CO
ftft-
f t  LTV t—ro ft ft
PO <D •H O■S 9
0 P
co(D
P9
r9u
9g
■=§
(D P  
P P
CD 4—1
p  f t  p  ft o S
ooo
t— 
C O
ca
ft1
0 0 O 0 O O O 0
0 0 O 0 O O O 0
0 0 O 0 00 f t  0 L Aft ft r> 0 l> 0
VO 0 VO CM ft VO f t ft
GO L T \ CO L A CO f t  f t f t
f t f t OV f t f t ov
f t n f\ r>
(O CM L A H ft
ro CO
p
P o  
CD 'I—D
tfloo
p•HO
fto
fto
ft
p
C D
P  •■H !>j ft 1—! 
C D  f t
P ft  
CD P
f t  CO
■H 5 Efl 0
p P -ft P 0
p 9 P -ft ft
0 0 a ft0 p p
9 s 0 ft 0 p<iq O p p
oS P ft 0 ft
ft O ft 0
ft ft to
P 9 0 0
m ffi p
M P 
P  C D
•H P
P P 
• H  P  
P
a  o
C D  P  
p 1 ft ■
P  0) 
co p  
O  P  
o  o
o0 I—l I—I I—1
f t  p
p
p  C O  
p  p  
f t  >  
0ra >a 
p  
P *H 
O  f — l
p  ft  
C O
o  P 
O  < D  
P  
0 P ft 9 ftP ft 
P o  
p
ft  p
0  CO
0  O  
o
ft0to
SI
NG
LE
 P
UR
PO
SE
 P
RO
JE
CT
86
£o
-H
-p0}0£CJ0Ph
I II II If II II f
I I I I I I I I I I I I
ooo*VO
COoo
&
PhQt£
CO
£ 0 
. -P
ts
-P
rHcd£&
£0
-Paa&
ooo
OOo
ooo
Ooo
oo
rH
OO 1 O 1
ooH
H oon HCM . COt—I CM
ft 1t*— ftCM
rHft i—i OO H CMHOJ CM
Oooft
oooft
OOO
ooo
OO
LA
oo i te- 1
OOCM-M"OJt-
GOoOO
CM00
A
CO0\CM
" ft (CO vo r
CM LA - CO £■— CO-M-
CM
H VO
CM
i—1 H
o
£
•p£oo
oo
rHE£
O
O
oft
O
o
o
o
o
o
a
a
o
o
o
VO
O
a i
pj- i
a
a
o
A 
OO 
t—ft
CSV
O
t~-
-£■
CM
A
-£■
CM
ft.
CM
CM
ft ■ i
A  1
A  ■
ft
CO
CM
CO
CO
CM
H A
CM
i~T
ft
H
-P£0sp>00
00fcto
Io
H££
££
0 *H
£3
EHO
EH
EHH
Us
ed
 t
o 
de
te
rm
in
e 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
co
st
 a
nd
 b
en
ef
it
 l
im
it
s 
fo
r 
se
pa
ra
bl
e 
co
st
-r
em
ai
ni
ng
 b
en
ef
it
 
me
th
od
. 
Wa
te
r 
su
pp
ly
 a
nd
 q
ua
li
ty
 a
rc
 c
om
bi
ne
d 
in
 t
he
-s
ub
se
qu
en
t 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
. 
: ' 
' - 
: 
■ 
■ -:
J
A
L
L
O
C
A
T
IO
N
 
O
F
 
P
R
O
JE
C
T
 
C
O
S
TS
87
ft
d
ft
O
EH
On on o w o  m
IA  J -  OJ H  r l
on ltn On oj ft-
f t  H  OJ IP  ft- 
r l  on r l
o -  o
O  o
CM o  C O P - l tn O H ltn
f t  i—I O  CM
0O CQ O
cm on on
O  f t  U"N t 
ON -ft  ft' 
on o on
ft
0
ft
d
o
o
ft
ft
03
0
•H
p
-H
ft
d
dft
ft
O
W
Eh
ftS
CD
u
u
0
ft
O  O  O  CM CO
ON mo mo on CM 
! r - m  on ro  o
f t  on on cm H
CQ
EH
ft
ft
dc
ft
ft
o
ft
l-l
la
H
ft
W
i
EH
CQ
O
O
ft
&d
ft
U
0
P
d
ft
O ft 
On on On lt\
ft ft- H O H 
On On on i— I co 
H  ft" H  H
rH
VO
CO on rH on
CM £— o
O on t—
ft H on
on r l  OJ • Vb. • '■ft- ONP vo 
on i on t—  
I l CM
u
0
«3
>
ft
o
p
0
O
o
f t 1 
f t  VO ft- CM on CM O• . * V b  • ■
I—1 on f t CM VO C—  £—
oo f t  LTN MO rH VO CO
ft CM CM 1 l H
0
>
•H
P  
d  
Pi 
fn 
0 
P  i—I
d
0
ft
P
ft
CD
P
P
0
prj
Hi
9
§ft
H
CQ
i—I 
O 
Ph 
P  
0  
o  
o
fto
o
ft
ft
O
©
Or\
H
-co­
co
p
CO
o
o
d
pi
Pi
d
ft
O  O  O  On H
LTN on ICN C—  C—  
VD CM VO t—  CO 
ft- on ft- CM P
0
p
0
o
o
0
s > .•rH
P
d
Pi
P-l
CD
P
5!
U1
-p  oi 
*H p
a  W
•rH Oft O
cS 0  i—IP ft<H d  ft d 0 Cd Cl ft 0 CD 
ffl CQ
CD
i—10 ft 
P  *i—f1 *r-f P-l
f t  Eh
CD
d  f t  
0  O
*  a
bQ Od ftlrH 4-^
d  d  
p  o  
d  O
a  H
CD f t
f t  <4
3 I 
I I 
l I 
l I 
l I
VO
w d
P  VO 
CQ '-—Jo
o
•S*
Ph 
B  
CD
d  ft
ON ft  f t  on• • tss. * -
ft- ft- ITNVO f t
1f t CO CM O  OO
CM ft- i—1 on L/N 
f t  ft
ft 0  0
0 P  P
bO
d  CQ “H
'H P  b? ftd  -h  t d
•H f t  O o  GO
d  0  f t  o  P
a  d P  H  0
0  0  d  H  O
ft pq ft < o
ft o
VO VO
ftd 0  
o  p  
O f t  H ft 
H  0  
<U d  
0
oS pq
0 bO 
I—I d  
f t  f t  
d  d  d ft 
d  dft a 
0 0 
CQ ft
0 CQ 
O O  
O  O
t—
0  CO 
d  - ft 0 
P  d1 ft
on ft  
i0 O 
d  f t  
f t  P  ft d^  ft
ft
0
p
do
o
ft cm on ft- -U^ VQ t— 00 ON O  
f t
p
d
0
d
o
o
o
p
3
&
Ph
0
"id
>
0 >> p ft 
P  P h
ft  
0  d  
o  0  
d
*rd $H
CQ 0
° td
ft
o
p
Se
pa
ra
bl
e 
co
at
 o
f 
wa
te
r 
qu
al
it
y 
is
 a
ll
oc
at
ed
 t
o 
wa
te
r 
su
pp
ly
.
88
nft
EH
B
O
H
p
03
EHCQ
O
O
Eh
O
ft
ft
o
ftft
ft
o
is;
o
EH
EH
<n
o
o
ft
ft
<
ro-t p- o
H Lf\VO t— 0\ LT\ _zf" rH
. i— |
O O O
O  ' L T V  L T V  t —  C\ I 0O rl
oo on vo
HCO HO I !
ro oo
o o> CJ\ o
VO VO
Ui
ftKjo
o
<p
o
tQ -p
-p a  
ui *t~to oo ft
0 ft i—I (U
3
o
-H4J
cd
ft ftdj i—I
03 <ij
o o oH 4) H ft < ft
CO
y  
cd 
■ f t  
<u
cd43
O 
f t  03
CV) no ft- LA 
H  r l  H  i — t
o o o
o o o
LTV o LTV
£■— 00 ft-
ft- CM CM0 \ 00 VO
rH
-ee-
H
-m -
I
P<ft O 
CQ f t  
O
*r-3 0o aPi (D ft ft
o 
uft
Pio O ft
o
O +3o ca H oft o
f t  Pift o Pi -H 
CQ -p 
CdPi (U <D Sh P O
cd a;> u
o o
o o
EP C O
• *
oo o
ft". OO
■ CM OO
■ -48-1 1 ftft pi<D 1 CQtn O
H Pi yft H 0 oa> * • cd P *H
S P cd PfsD E Q 0 > cd■H o ft 0
E Q o Lf\ CM o PiCQ * • O p Ocd OJ o OO P 0
rH 1—1 00 ft PiCQ p CM P 0
E Q cd CQ P ftCD Pi O cd Pift cd o y cd
89
Pimp
|23
PiPPiOo
H
X!HOPPICmCm<
Oo
oAI—1-S9-
POHEH<uO
Pi
Pi<
EHCQOo
p o o
t—i CM VO VO
ctj VO oa 0J
p QO on p
O A A
EH P LTV VO
on m
do
*H t-- o  o o
P * p . • • •
cfl P p P  o P
0) VO p on o\ CM
u cm O  P Lf\
O ' A A
o Lf\ LT\
ffi
X
Pi
ft
P p 00 cO
d • p . • •
CQ .On LT\ VO VO
c— on a\
P t— t—
0) A A
P p P
d
P
Pof.M
P o- OJ CMfl - P * *o .LA P cO cO
o P 03 O a
LO P p
P A A Ao P On Ovo C M CM
1—I
p
P
1--1to l VO] ~i P 1 P
to P
O .  C D
o 0) d
a p
p P p P
d P d
C D 1—1 C D
8 d 8
P co P p
ui P O m
0J m P . QJ
t> O X
d O o d
H  ■ p p
P
Pi d VO fdo ■ C D p . Q>
s p
d p C D do to d o P
*H a; P o <
p P P [— ”j P
d d 3--1 O
o hH p < EHo
p  ■
p
< 4
VO t — O 0 ON
H 1— 1 p P
